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ABSTRACT
The issue of funeral picketing has received national media cov-
erage and resulted in a frenzy of recent legislation.  The group re-
sponsible for the funeral picketing, Westboro Baptist Church, has
targeted the funerals of soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan,
homosexuals, political figures, and even children.  Some may dismiss
Westboro as a fringe group; however, at least twenty-nine states, the
federal government, and the mourners who have been eyewitnesses to
the group’s tactics have taken notice of and responded to the group’s
activities.
Funeral picketing raises crucial First Amendment issues, in-
cluding whether the Supreme Court’s interest in protecting unwilling
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listeners and captive audiences is broad enough to cover mourners.
This Article reflects on whether the state should recognize mourning
as a legitimate interest and how that interest should be properly bal-
anced against the right of free speech.  In an attempt to respond to
this issue, the majority of state legislatures have produced laws that
are unconstitutional because of their geographic overbreadth.  This
Article examines the legislative response to funeral picketing and pro-
poses ways the statutes can be constitutionally defensible.  Addition-
ally, it argues for expansion of the captive audience doctrine and
illustrates why privacy in mourning is as important as privacy in the
home.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of paying respect to the dead is a concept as old as civili-
zation itself.1  Respecting the dead and a time of mourning is revered
by the religious and the non-religious alike.  Some view respecting the
dead and a time of mourning as a simple matter of human decency.2
The existence of a religious group, specifically a Christian church,
choosing to spread its message through picketing at funerals is aston-
ishing.  The Christian Bible states that there is a “time for everything,
and a season for every activity under heaven,” including a time to
mourn.3  It also instructs Christians4 to “weep with those who weep,”
and “[r]ejoice with those who rejoice.”5
The very concept of funeral picketing is a strange paradox.6
Death of a friend, acquaintance, or loved one is a universal experi-
ence that crosses social class, economic ability, religious beliefs, politi-
cal status, and ethnic background.  Funerals, including military
funerals, raise unique privacy concerns.  Arguably, attending a funeral
can be one of the most private and painful of human experiences.
Specific emotions may vary from one funeral to the next; however, the
emotional impact of death raises the need for privacy.  In a Freedom
of Information Act case, a unanimous Supreme Court noted that
1. Archaeologists identified evidence of funerary behavior “within the last 100,000
years, in the Middle and Upper Palaeolithic.” MIKE PARKER PEARSON, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF
DEATH AND BURIAL 148 (D. Gentry Steele ed., 2000).  Early Neanderthal remains “provide
evidence of mortuary practices in the form of body positioning, grave construction, placing
of artifacts and animal parts in the grave, the arrangement of stones around the grave, and
even the placing of flowers in the grave.” Id.  There is also evidence of formal burial behav-
ior occurring before Neanderthals. Id. at 149; see also Paul Pettitt, When Burial Begins, BRIT.
ARCHAEOLOGY, Aug. 2002, available at http://www.britarch.ac.uk/BA/ba66/feat1.shtml
(describing early funerary behavior dating back as far as 300,000 years ago).
2. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445,
516–17 & nn. 437–38 (1997) (noting that laws have long existed to enforce respect in the
handling and burying of the dead).  The American legal system demonstrates its respect
for the dead in tort and criminal law. Id.  It is an offense in many jurisdictions to desecrate
a dead body.  For example, possible tort actions related to corpses include intentional
mishandling of a dead body and negligent or wrongful interference with a dead body.
Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New Property Regime in Human Bodies and Body
Parts, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 29 (2002). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979 & Supp. 2007) (describing the cause of action in tort of “Inter-
ference with Dead Bodies” and reporting cases on the same).
3. Ecclesiastes 3:4.
4. The term “Christian” is employed by a variety of individuals to mean different
things.  The most common definition is “a believer in and a follower of Jesus Christ.” MER-
RILL F. UNGER, THE NEW UNGER’S BIBLE DICTIONARY 226 (R.K. Harrison ed., 1988).
5. Romans 12:15.
6. Although the term “funeral” is used throughout this Article, it is meant to encom-
pass all services to honor the dead, including memorial services, graveside services, and
wakes, no matter where they are held.
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“[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect
they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their own.”7
How one handles death varies by culture; however, it typically in-
cludes “a core of understandings, spiritual beliefs, rituals, expectations
and etiquette.”8  Today, in the United States, activities surrounding
death typically involve signs of respect, grief, and reflection.
Unlike most civilian funerals, military funerals include a public
dimension.  Funerals for soldiers killed in war generate greater public-
ity.  Veteran funerals are also entitled to certain military funeral hon-
ors,9 including the presentation of a United States flag and the
playing of Taps.10  What the United States must answer as a society is
whether a funeral is an appropriate time or place for protesting, and
whether the right to free speech, even that speech expressed in a
traditional public forum, should have limits.11  Should there be a le-
gally recognized time to mourn?
7. Nat’l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004) (unani-
mous).  If the Supreme Court can state this with respect to a request for documents, surely
a case can be made for protecting mourners from physical and emotional intrusions.
8. Paul C. Rosenblatt, Grief in Small-Scale Societies, in DEATH AND BEREAVEMENT ACROSS
CULTURES 27, 30 (Colin Murray Parkes et al. eds., 1997).
9. 10 U.S.C. § 1491(a)–(c) (2000); see also Major Samuel W. Morris, A Survey of Military
Retirement Benefits, 177 MIL. L. REV. 133, 152 & n.117 (2003) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF VETER-
ANS’ AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS AND DEPENDENTS 46 (2001)) (explaining the
benefits available for “eligible veterans”).  Individuals who join the military have an assur-
ance that their surviving family members will feel support from the tradition the military
offers through a military honors funeral.  The playing of Taps, the display of the flag, and a
gun salute can have an important meaning to military families.  The symbols used in mili-
tary funerals are meant to show honor toward deceased soldiers and their families.  Unfor-
tunately, the very symbols used to honor deceased soldiers may trigger funeral picketers to
action.  Westboro Baptist Church claims it does not picket private funerals, only public
ones. See A Message From Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) to Lawmakers on Legislation
Regarding Her Counter-Demonstrations at Funerals of Dead Soldiers (Dec. 12, 2005),
http://www.godhatesfags.com/writings/20051212_legislation-message.pdf [hereinafter A
Message from WBC to Lawmakers] (“If any family of a dead soldier wants a private funeral,
all they have to do is tell the military and bikers to stay home, and have a private fu-
neral. . . .  When they do, there is no public event.”).  Consequently, family members may
escape picketing if they acquiesce to a funeral conforming to Westboro’s definition of
private, and relinquish their right to a military burial.
10. 10 U.S.C. § 1491(c) (2000).  Taps is a bugle call traditionally played at military
funerals and memorial services in the United States.  It was written during the Civil War by
General Daniel Adams Butterfield and Oliver Willcox Norton in 1862. See Jari A. Vil-
lanueva, Twenty-four Notes That Tap Deep Emotions, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/
taps.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (providing historical background on Taps).
11. The First Amendment right of free speech is esteemed, but it is not absolute. See
Patti Stanley, Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Does the Right to Free Speech Trump the
Right to Worship?, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 273, 273 (2000) (acknowledging that the
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Funeral picketing is a novel concept pioneered by a group identi-
fied as Westboro Baptist Church (Westboro).12  Westboro has led pro-
tests and demonstrations for over fifteen years, but recently gained
substantial media and legislative attention when it began to protest at
military funerals.13
right of free speech is not absolute); Note, Hate Is Not Speech: A Constitutional Defense of
Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1317 (1993) (“[T]he First
Amendment does not give absolute protection to every act that has any communicative
content.”).
12. Westboro has no known affiliation with mainstream Baptist conventions like the
Southern or National Baptist Convention. See Brian Goodman, Funeral Picketers Sued By
Marine’s Dad: Lawsuit Claims Anti-Gay Church Furthers Grief for Families of Dead, CBS NEWS,
July 28, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/27/national/main1843396.
shtml (proclaiming that Westboro is not affiliated with any “mainstream Baptist organiza-
tion”).  Westboro’s pastor and founder, Fred Phelps, is a former civil rights attorney.  Judy
Keen, Funeral protesters say laws can’t silence them, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2006, at 5A.  The
picketing activities of the group are unique to Westboro and have not been practiced by
any Baptist, Christian, or other religious group. See The Westboro Baptist Church Fre-
quently Asked Questions, http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2008) [hereinafter Westboro, Frequently Asked Questions] (describing Westboro’s picket-
ing as “unique”).  Westboro has been described by some as a hate group. See Southern
Poverty Law Center, Anti-Gay Extremism, http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/arti-
cle.jsp?aid=742 (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (referring to Westboro as a “notorious anti-gay
hate group”).  Westboro clearly does not see itself as a hate group, and denounces racism
and physical violence; rather, it has expressed intolerance for what it sees as sin.  See
Westboro, Frequently Asked Questions, supra (stating that the group does not believe in
physical violence or racism, but that God preaches against homosexuality).  Two of the sins
identified by Westboro are homosexuality and idolatry. See A Message From WBC to
Lawmakers, supra note 9.  Westboro believes America has embraced homosexuality and is R
consequently being punished. See id. (proclaiming that soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq
were raised hearing about acceptance of homosexuality and that this “generation [is] now
being blown to bits by IEDs”).  In Westboro’s eyes, the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, and the deaths of American soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, were an example
of God’s disgust toward America.  Press Release, Westboro, Thank God for Tsunami.
Thank God for 3,000 dead Americans! (Jan. 1, 2005), http://www.godhatesfags.com/fli-
ers/jan2005/Tsunami_1-1-2005.pdf; Press Release, Westboro, America.  A sodomite nation
of flag-worshiping idolaters (May 11, 2006), http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/may
2006/20060511_week-777.pdf.  According to Westboro, idolatry includes worshiping the
dead instead of God by elevating them to the status of heroes.  A Message From WBC to
Lawmakers, supra note 9.  Westboro believes God’s wrath has turned against America. See R
id. (“[American lawmakers’] acts are all equally impotent under the force of the condign
wrath of the Almighty God!”).  Westboro is the only such group as yet to view funerals as an
appropriate forum to spread its message; however, their relative success in gaining public-
ity may lead other groups to begin picketing at funerals as well.
13. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A14 (reporting that states and Congress are beginning to pass laws
restricting Westboro’s funeral demonstrations, and reflecting the attention the media has
given the issue).
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This Article proposes a balance between the right to mourn and
the right to free speech.14  Part II provides background on Westboro’s
First Amendment activities, including the nature of its speech and
motivations.
Part III argues that the right to privacy, which includes a right to
mourn, is a substantial interest worthy of protection from intrusive
speech.  Funeral protests can cause additional emotional distress for
mourners and can disrupt the peaceful nature of the funeral.  Courts
should recognize the right to mourn as a significant interest.
Part IV will examine the constitutional scrutiny of speech in a
public forum in light of the legislative response by the federal and
numerous state governments.  In less than two years, over twenty states
have enacted legislation to address the issue of funeral picketing.  Part
IV examines the common themes in the legislation and addresses
whether the legislation will be viewed as content based or content
neutral.  The statutes enacted thus far do not attempt to restrict
Westboro’s message, but impose time, place, and manner restrictions.
The legislation will likely be viewed as content neutral by the courts.
Finally, Part IV examines and critiques three constitutional challenges
to the recent legislation.
Part V concludes by proposing ways the statutes can survive con-
stitutional challenges either by making the statutes more narrowly tai-
lored or expanding the current captive audience doctrine to funerals
and memorial services.
II. FUNERAL PICKETING AND WESTBORO
Funeral picketing raises important constitutional concerns that
go beyond Westboro.  Nonetheless, understanding Westboro and its
motivations is essential to understanding the speech interests at is-
sue.15  Westboro has inspired twenty-seven legislative bodies into ac-
14. In addition to protecting free speech, the First Amendment protects the free exer-
cise of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Although protection under the Free Exercise
Clause can be asserted by Westboro and the mourners, it is outside the scope of this
Article.
15. Most information about Westboro and its beliefs are located on its various websites.
See Westboro, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12 (providing information about R
Westboro and its beliefs); Westboro, God Hates America Home Page, http://www.god
hatesamerica.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Westboro, God Hates America
Home Page] (same).  Based on the websites and the various press releases therein, it seems
Westboro’s primary goal is to publicize its message.  The message appears to be about
God’s purported judgment of America for its sins, particularly America’s alleged support
of homosexuality.  God’s wrath, the group believes, is evident in natural disasters,
Westboro, Thank God For Katrina (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.godhatesfags.com/fea-
tures/20050831_thank-god-for-katrina.html, terrorist attacks, Press Release, Westboro,
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tion in less than two years.16  Members of Westboro have been
subjected to threats and abusive language during their protests, al-
though they are cautious to abide by local laws.17  The Southern Pov-
erty Law Center identified Westboro as a hate group,18 while
Westboro identifies itself as a religious group.19  If Westboro is a hate
Thank God for Tsunami.  Thank God for 3,000 dead Americans! (Jan. 1, 2005), http://
www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/jan2005/Tsunami_1-1-2005.pdf, and soldiers dying in the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Press Release, Westboro, America.  A sodomite nation of flag-
worshiping idolaters (May 11, 2006), http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/may2006/2006
0511_week-777.pdf.  The group’s message is also evident in their protest signs: “Thank God
for Dead Soldiers,” and “Thank God for IEDs.”  McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975,
984 (E.D. Ky. 2006).  The acronym “IEDs” refers to Improvised Explosive Devices, home-
made devices designed to cause death or injury.  Although Westboro’s speech may impli-
cate the fighting words doctrine, that doctrine’s application to funeral picketing is
unlikely, and thus outside the scope of this Article. See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 569–72 (1942) (explaining that fighting words are words which can
inflict injury and tend to lead to breached peace).
16. David L. Hudson Jr., Assembly, Overview of Funeral Protests, (Oct. 2006), http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/Assembly/topic.aspx?topic=funeral_protests [hereinafter
Hudson, Funeral Protests].
17. See Molly McDonough, Picket Fencing, 92 A.B.A. J. 16, 18 (2006) (describing
Westboro as cautious, frequently notifying the media and local law enforcement, agreeing
on a time and place for the demonstration, and abiding by law enforcement directives).
On its website, Westboro explains its picketing activities:
We stand at a respectful distance, on lawfully accessed public right of ways, and
hold up some signs with words. . . .  When they falsely claim the soldier is in
heaven, we’re going to speak words of truth, that the soldier is in hell.  When the
soldier’s family members walk hundreds of feet, sometimes hundreds of yards, to
stand squarely in front of us and cuss us, we’re going to remind them that their
loved one is going to cuss them eons in hell for lying to them on the important
matters of eternity.
A Message From WBC to Lawmakers, supra note 9. R
18. See Alvarez, supra note 13, at A14 (indicating that the Southern Poverty Law Center R
has put Westboro “on its watch list”).
19. The group identifies itself as Baptist, a Christian denomination.  The Westboro
Baptist Church Home Page, http://www.godhatesfags.com/written/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.
html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Westboro Home Page].  According to its web-
site, the group professes to follow the teachings of Sixteenth Century theologian John Cal-
vin. Id.  On the organization’s manifesto, Westboro calls itself a five-point Calvinism
church. Id.  Calvinism at its extreme results in hyper-Calvinism, which some scholars con-
sider “an aberration from true Calvinism.” IAIN H. MURRAY, SPURGEON V. HYPER-CALVINISM:
THE BATTLE FOR GOSPEL PREACHING 40 (1997).  For example, while Christianity as a relig-
ion is characterized for its outreach to reconcile sinners to God through salvation, hyper-
Calvinism essentially believes God will save only those he has preselected to save, thus out-
reach to others (i.e., “witnessing”) is unnecessary.  Westboro has not directly identified
itself as embracing hyper-Calvinism, but evidence of hyper-Calvinism is present in the FAQ
section of the group’s website. See Westboro, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12 R
(stating in response to the question “Doesn’t the Bible say that God loves everyone,” that
“God certainly is love, toward His elect (His children).  But He certainly is not love toward
the reprobate (children of the devil).”).
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group, a primary target of its hate is homosexuality.20  Westboro be-
lieves it is spreading religious messages, not political ones.21  Picketing
is one of the primary avenues the group uses to spread its message.22
Picketing is a relatively low-cost form of expression and Westboro’s
picketing has generated tremendous publicity.
The picketing has targeted gatherings as diverse as gay pride
weeks, the Southern Baptist Convention, the American Civil Liberties
Union, and Billy Graham Crusades.23  The group, however, first
gained substantial media attention in 1998 when it picketed the fu-
neral of Matthew Shepard, a young man who was murdered because
of his sexual orientation.24
The group has not limited its picketing activities to known homo-
sexuals.  Other notable funerals Westboro has picketed include that of
Coretta Scott King,25 Ronald Reagan,26 Chief Justice William Rehn-
20. Westboro Home Page, supra note 19.  Although Westboro has been very vocal re- R
garding homosexuality, it is not the group’s sole concern.  In addition to viewing homosex-
uality as a sin, Westboro is critical of forms of idolatry, also a sin in the group’s view. See A
Message From WBC to Lawmakers, supra note 9 (stating that Westboro believes America R
worships the dead and that “[t]his [is a] distinct form of idolatry”).  The United States, it
claims, has committed idolatry by worshiping the dead through memorial services instead
of worshiping God. Id.
21. In a press release, the group stated: “We aren’t anti-war protesters; we aren’t anti-
don’t-ask-don’t-tell protesters; we’re the prophets of God.  We don’t care who’s in office;
we don’t care about your politics; we don’t care about your policies on the war.”  A Mes-
sage From WBC to Lawmakers, supra note 9. R
22. Westboro, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12.  The group explains on its R
web page that other means of spreading its message include press releases, its web page,
faxes, and television. Id.  Arguably, if limits were placed on funeral picketing the group
would still have ample alternative means of communicating its message. See discussion
infra Part V.A.
23. See Westboro, Flier Archive (2006), http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/flier
archive2006.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) for a list of the group’s past fliers and the
events at which they were used.  Interestingly, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
criticized by Westboro as the “Anti-Christ Lawsuit Union” and the “Anal Copulators & Les-
bians Union,” Press Release, Westboro (Dec. 16, 2003), http://www.godhatesamerica.
com/ghfmir/fliers/dec2003/Aclu_12-16-2003.pdf, is representing the group in its chal-
lenge against the Missouri funeral picketing statute.  Press Release, ACLU of Eastern Mis-
souri, Funeral Protest Challenge (July 21, 2006), http://www.aclu-em.org/pressroom/
2006pressreleases/72106funeralprotestchallen.htm.
24. Goodman, supra note 12.  Westboro displays on its website the number of days it R
believes Matthew Shepard has been in hell on its “Gospel Memorial to Matthew Shepard.”
Westboro, Gospel Memorial to Matthew Shepard, http://www.godhatesfags.com/library/
memorials/matthewshepardmemorial.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).  While the group
claims that they do not support Shepard’s murder, they are quick to say that Shepard “got
himself killed” looking for homosexual sex. Id.  The site includes a photograph of Shepard
with red flames surrounding his face. Id.
25. Press Release, Westboro, WBC to Picket the Funeral of Coretta Scott King (Feb. 3,
2006), http://www.godhatesamerica.com/pdf/king.pdf.
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quist,27 and Fred Rogers of the television show, “Mr. Rogers’s Neigh-
borhood.”28  Westboro also appears at other tragic events that
generate media coverage, like the funerals of coal miners killed in
West Virginia,29 and children.30  According to its website, the group
believes funerals are the perfect time to spread its message because
they are events at which people consider their own mortality.31  While
funerals do not appear to be “the perfect time” to spread political
messages, individuals do tend to be more vulnerable at funerals:
[T]he idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal
like nothing else; it is a mainspring of human activity—activ-
ity designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to over-
come it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny for
man . . . the fear of death is indeed a universal in the human
condition.32
Although Westboro has been demonstrating for over fifteen
years, it did not motivate the general public into action when its mem-
bers picketed the funerals of targeted political figures or known
homosexuals.33  In fact, Westboro’s presence at the funerals of Mat-
thew Shepard, Coretta Scott King, Ronald Reagan, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist received hardly any media attention or legislative re-
sponse.34  It was not until Westboro’s funeral picketing activities hit a
26. Press Release, Westboro, Picketing of Ronald Reagan’s Funeral (June 7, 2004),
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/jun2004/Reagan_Funeral_Schedule_6–7–2004.pdf.
27. Press Release, Westboro, Westboro to Picket Funeral of Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist (Sept. 5, 2005), http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/sep2005/20050905_rehnquist-
funeral.pdf.
28. Phillip Elliott, Group to Demonstrate at Services for Local Soldier Killed in Iraq, EVANS-
VILLE COURIER & PRESS, Jan. 6, 2006, at A1.
29. Press Release, Judgment in West Virginia! Thank God for His Outpoured Wrath
and for 12 Dead Miners (Jan. 6, 2006), http://www.godhatesamerica.com/pdf/wvminers.
pdf.
30. Press Release, Westboro, WBC to Picket Funerals of Pennsylvania School Girls
(Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/oct2006/20061004_amish-picket-can-
celled.pdf [hereinafter Press Release, Pennsylvania School Girls] (picket ultimately can-
celled in exchange for media air time); Press Release, Westboro, WBC to Picket the
Funeral of Little Year-old Pennsylvanian Nyia Page (Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.godhates
fags.com/fliers/feb2007/20070209_nyia-page-funeral.pdf.
31. Westboro, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12. R
32. PEARSON, supra note 1, at 142 (quoting ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, at ix R
(1973)).
33. McDonough, supra note 17, at 16. R
34. The first state to enact legislation in response to Westboro’s activities was
Westboro’s home state of Kansas.  Hudson, Funeral Protests, supra note 16; see also KAN. R
STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (1995).  Westboro successfully argued that the Act was overly broad
and it was amended.  Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997); see also
Hudson, Funeral Protests, supra note 16.  Massachusetts and Oklahoma had similar laws R
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raw nerve—the funerals of deceased soldiers killed in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan—that legislatures and the public took notice.35
Although Westboro is a relatively small organization,36 it has had
a large impact on several states in a short period of time.  According
to the First Amendment Center, between 2005 and 2006 thirty-four
states saw legislation addressing funeral picketing proposed, with
twenty-seven of those states ultimately passing such laws.37  Many of
the states passed emergency legislation in reaction to the group
threatening to picket funerals in their states.38  The knee-jerk legisla-
tive responses from the different states are similar in many aspects.
Whether courts will interpret the laws as content neutral or content
based will be the key to their survival.  Westboro’s activities have raised
an important issue that needs further clarification: how to strike a bal-
ance between the right to mourn and the right of free speech.
III. PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO MOURN AS A LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
A. The Right to Mourn and Privacy
An important issue in determining whether a statute is constitu-
tional is the governmental interest involved.  The governmental inter-
est involved in the funeral picketing statutes is protection of what I
characterize as “the right to mourn.”39  The distinct problem with bal-
ancing the right to mourn against the right of free speech is that free
speech is a well-recognized fundamental right.40  The right to mourn
is not.  The right to mourn is a concept based on the need for individ-
uals to mourn in peace.  It includes an interest in respecting privacy
during the mourning process and a desire to protect individuals from
additional emotional distress.
criminalizing disruption of a funeral. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 42 (LexisNexis 1998);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1166 (West Supp. 2007).
35. McDonough, supra note 17, at 16. R
36. Interestingly, Westboro consists of seventy-five members, many of whom are related
to the pastor, Fred Phelps, by birth or marriage.  Dan Lavoie, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 20,
2006, at 6.
37. Hudson, Funeral Protests, supra note 16. R
38. E.g., Dennis Hoey, Church Group Targets Fallen Soldier’s Funeral, PORTLAND PRESS HER-
ALD, Mar. 23, 2006, at A1.
39. Another governmental interest is to protect unwilling listeners. See discussion infra
Part V.B.
40. The Supreme Court has stated that “citizens must tolerate insulting, and even out-
rageous, speech in order to provide ‘adequate “breathing space” to the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment.’”  Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (quoting Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
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The Court has accepted most interests articulated by the govern-
ment as legitimate,41 including an interest in noise reduction,42 es-
thetics,43 public safety,44 and protecting citizens from unnecessary and
unwanted emotional distress.45  Although the Supreme Court has not
specifically recognized the right to mourn, it might be considered an
extension of the greater privacy right.46  Justice Brandeis gave birth to
the right of privacy in a dissenting opinion when he discussed the
general “right to be let alone.”47  Traditionally, the right to privacy
related to freedom of choice in marriage, sex, and reproduction.48
Although the right to mourn has not yet been established, courts have
held that the right of privacy encompasses other rights, including the
rights of unwilling listeners and the right to worship.49
Justice Brandeis described the right to be “let alone” as “the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”50
Justice Brandeis’ right to be “let alone” was asserted to support the
privacy rights of the unwilling listener in Hill v. Colorado.51 Hill, an
abortion buffer-zone case, evaluated the constitutionality of a state
41. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16 (2d ed. 2005) (outlining the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and its
willingness to accept most government interests in curtailing speech as legitimate).
42. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (holding that a city’s
sound-amplification guideline was constitutional).
43. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816–17 (1984) (holding
that the government’s interest in avoiding visual “clutter” was sufficient to justify a content-
neutral restriction on signs).
44. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
45. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000) (upholding a statute imposing certain
physical space restrictions in order to protect people entering health care facilities from
unwelcome encounters).
46. The right of privacy was formally developed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
483 (1965).  Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, explained that the right is found in
the penumbras of guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 483–84.
47. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 41, at 478 (“Brandeis advocated a reading of the R
Fourth Amendment in order to insure that the government did not intrude the ‘privacy of
the individual.’”); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890).
48. In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun recognized the right of privacy, whether based on
the Fourteenth Amendment or the Ninth Amendment, as broad enough to include a wo-
man’s right to have an abortion.  410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).  Constitutional protection for
privacy was asserted more recently in Lawrence v. Texas when the Supreme Court struck
down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual activity.  539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
49. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 718 (recognizing a patient’s interest in remaining free
from unwanted communication from protesters when entering a health care facility); St.
David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821, 830 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1996) (concluding the right to worship is an important interest).
50. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
51. 530 U.S. at 716–17.
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statute that regulated speech within 100 feet of the entrance to health
care facilities.52  The statute created a bubble zone that prohibited
individuals from approaching closer than eight feet without consent
of the speaker.53  The Court held in a 6-3 decision that the statute was
a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.54  One of
the most significant aspects of Hill was the Court’s decision to balance
the interests of unwilling listeners against the right of free speech
outside the home.55  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, ex-
plained that “[t]he right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be
placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate.”56  There
is no time when the right to be let alone would be more poignant
than when one is grieving the loss of a loved one and attending rituals
related to burial.
Burial customs help satisfy some essential psychological, religious,
and social needs.57  Funeral practices help the bereaved find comfort
and accept the reality of death.  A funeral is the most important time
to be left alone.  Westboro’s picketing of funerals confronts mourners
52. Id. at 707. Hill is an imperfect analogy because it involved the recognized right to
abortion.  Yet, Hill remains essential because of the Court’s discussion of the interests of
unwilling listeners.  In a footnote, the majority clarified that the right to be let alone is
“more accurately characterized as an ‘interest’ that States can choose to protect in certain
situations.” Id. at 716–17 n.24.  One of the reasons Hill is so significant is that it attempted
to balance an important interest against the fundamental First Amendment right of free
speech.
53. Id. at 707.
54. Id. at 725.
55. Id. at 714–16.  The Court addressed the right of unwilling listeners in the limited
context of the privacy of one’s home in Frisby v. Schultz. See 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988)
(construing the statute to only prohibit targeted picketing in front of specific residences
and explaining “[o]ne important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwilling
listener”); see also discussion infra Part V.B.
56. Hill, 530 U.S. at 718 (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736
(1970)).  The Court’s recognition of the right of unwilling listeners has received substan-
tial criticism. See, e.g., id. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ‘right to be let alone’ . . . is
not an interest that may be legitimately weighed against the speakers’ First Amendment
rights . . . .”); William E. Lee, The Unwilling Listener: Hill v. Colorado’s Chilling Effect on
Unorthodox Speech, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 387, 390 (2002) (claiming that Hill’s protection of
a privacy interest of unwilling listeners “is a house of cards that collapses upon close exami-
nation”); Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill v.
Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for An Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51
AM. U. L. REV. 179, 202 (2001) (“The Court’s surprising identification of the unwilling
listener interest as a strong potential counterweight to traditional public forum free speech
rights is a most troubling development, but also puzzling in its doctrinal ramifications.”).
57. Rev. William A. Wendt, Death Rituals, AM. J. HOSPICE CARE, Winter 1984, at 24,
25–26.
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during a vulnerable period.58  It is because of this vulnerability that
the right to privacy should be respected.
B. Mourning as an Important Value
The Supreme Court has recognized the emotional and physical
impact of First Amendment activities on emotionally vulnerable indi-
viduals such as medical patients and their families.59  As the Court
explained in NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc.,60 “[h]ospitals, after all,
are . . . where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional
strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are princi-
pal facets of the day’s activity, and where the patient and his family . . .
need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.”61  Sim-
ilarly, in Hill, the Court expressed concern over abortion protesters
closely approaching patients who “are often in particularly vulnerable
physical and emotional conditions.”62  The emotional distress in-
volved in bereavement is well documented, and a state’s interest in
minimizing further distress should be considered legitimate.63
The loss of a loved one can trigger the grieving process.64  It is a
time of great vulnerability when people question their lives, faith, and
mortality.  Although people grieve in different ways, feelings of grief
are only exacerbated when special circumstances surround the
death.65
58. On its website’s FAQ, the group explained that they picket funerals “[t]o warn the
people who are still living that unless they repent, they will likewise perish.  When people
go to funerals, they have thoughts of mortality, heaven, hell, eternity, etc., on their minds.
It’s the perfect time to warn them of things to come.”  Westboro, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, supra note 12. R
59. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 729–30 (upholding a state statute regulating the free speech
rights of visitors to a health care facility because, “[p]ersons who are attempting to enter
health care facilities—for any purpose—are often in particularly vulnerable physical and
emotional conditions”).
60. 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
61. Id. at 783–84 n.12 (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 509 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
62. Hill, 530 U.S. at 729.
63. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Center for Law & Justice Supporting
Defendants and Urging Denial of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9,
Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691 (W.D. Mo. 2007) (No. 06-cv-4156) (“[T]he
emotional vulnerability of bereaved funeral mourners would in most cases exceed that of
home residents as well as those who are entering health care facilities.”).
64. “Grief is a wholly natural reaction to the loss of a cherished object or person.
While there are cultural variations, particularly with regard to bereavement rituals, there
are consistent themes of grieving and behaviour.”  Susan Klein & David A. Alexander, Good
Grief: a medical challenge, 5 TRAUMA 261, 262 (2003) (internal citations omitted).  Emotions
expressed by bereaved individuals may include shock or denial.
65. See id. (explaining that the nature of the death can implicate how people grieve).
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Regardless of whether death is viewed as a time of celebration or
mourning, it is a deeply private time.  The pain of the bereaved is even
more pronounced when the death involves a life sacrificed because of
the tragedy of violence or war.  Some scholars have suggested that sur-
vivors are comforted by feelings that their loved one died for a noble
cause.66
Military deaths can be especially painful because the deaths tend
to be abrupt.67  Although the ages of soldiers killed in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan vary, a large number have been in their early twenties.68  In
addition to the tragedy of a premature death, some families must con-
duct services without a body or with a closed casket.  For a loved one
trying to come to grips with death, these issues make the emotional
distress experienced even more pronounced.69  Taunting by picketers
proclaiming to mourners that their loved one is going to hell reasona-
bly results in additional emotional distress.70
It has been noted:
Surely one of the most prominent aspects of death is its po-
tential for intense emotional impact on the survivors.  The
reasons are as numerous as they are obvious.  There is the
simple but often searing fact of separation from a loved one;
the realization that he or she will no longer enjoy the fruits
of life; the suddenness with which death strikes.  There can
be fear for one’s own life, and fear of the power of death in
general.  There may be anger, directed diffusely at the de-
66. See Paul T. Bartone & Morten G. Ender, Organizational Responses to Death in the Mili-
tary, 18 DEATH STUDIES 25, 33 (1994) (“[M]any family members appear to have less trouble
adjusting to the death of a loved one when the loss is construed as serving a noble or ‘good
cause,’ such as defending one’s country or family, as opposed to a senseless event like a car
accident or natural disaster.”).
67. Eyal Ben-Ari, Epilogue: A “Good” Military Death, 31 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 651, 653
(2005).
68. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Fallen Warriors, http://www.defendamerica.mil/fallen.
html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (listing the names and ages of the soldiers killed in combat
in Iraq and Afghanistan to date).
69. Klein & Alexander, supra note 64, at 266–67.  Many individuals go through the R
bereavement process without counseling. Id. at 263.  Individuals who are grieving can ex-
perience increased rates of depression, alcohol misuse, anxiety, suicide, phobias, and
mania. Id. at 268.
70. Surviving father Albert Snyder claimed the news coverage and Internet postings
about Westboro’s protests at his son’s funeral deepened his depression.  Snyder received a
$10.9 million verdict against Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
invasion of privacy, which was reduced to $5 million by the federal judge who presided
over the case.  Matthew Dolan, Judge cuts court award; anti-gay church sees reduction of penalty
for protest, BALT. SUN, Feb. 5, 2008, at 1B.
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ceased, or at the persons or powers held responsible.  Finally,
there are various strong reactions to the corpse itself.71
The government has a valid interest in protecting families during
their grieving process; consequently, the right to mourn should be
recognized by the courts as a legitimate and significant governmental
interest.
C. The Right to Mourn and the Right to Worship
The right to mourn is a novel interest that can be loosely analo-
gized to the right to worship.  Many burial services in the United
States are religious in nature,72 although military funerals are tradi-
tionally secular.73  Courts and scholars are slowly recognizing the right
to worship (independent from the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause).74  Because most of the enacted legislation is not limited to
military funerals,75 examining the right to worship demonstrates the
application of privacy rights outside the traditional reproductive
context.76
In Olmer v. City of Lincoln,77 the Eighth Circuit declined to address
the right to worship directly, but noted that the state’s interest in pro-
tecting this right, “in the abstract, is undoubtedly substantial and im-
portant.”78 Olmer was an appeal from a preliminary injunction
enjoining the enforcement of a local ordinance.79  The ordinance re-
stricted focused picketing of churches and other religious premises
thirty minutes before, during, and after scheduled religious activi-
71. PETER METCALF & RICHARD HUNTINGTON, CELEBRATIONS OF DEATH: THE ANTHRO-
POLOGY OF MORTUARY RITUAL 43 (2d ed. 1991).
72. See Tony Walter, Secularization, in DEATH & BEREAVEMENT ACROSS CULTURES 166,
170 (Colin Murray Parkes et al. eds., 1997) (estimating that, globally, 50% to 90% of funer-
als are religious).
73. See David Rittgers, These Dishonored Dead: Veteran Memorials and Religious Preferences, 5
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 400, 410–11 (2007) (discussing the secular traditions that occur at
military funerals).
74. See, e.g., St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d
821, 830 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the government has an interest in safeguarding
the right to privacy in a place of worship).
75. With the exception of Delaware and Florida, no state picketing statute limits the
picketing prohibition to military funerals. See infra Appendix.
76. See Alan Phelps, Note, Picketing and Prayer: Restricting Freedom of Expression Outside
Churches, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 291–97 (1999) (discussing privacy rights as commonly
applied to reproductive interests, as well as the application of privacy rights to the right to
worship).
77. 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
78. Id. at 1180.
79. Id. at 1178.
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ties.80  The respondents were abortion protesters who protested the
appointment of an abortion doctor as deacon and elder at Westmin-
ster Presbyterian Church.81  The court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to protect a sig-
nificant government interest.82  Judge Bright, in his dissent, poign-
antly argued that the right of freedom of worship is as important as
the right of privacy in the home.83
Unlike Olmer, the Kansas Court of Appeals concluded that the
right to worship is an important government interest.84  In St. David’s
Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., Westboro appealed a
temporary injunction enjoining it from focused picketing on the pub-
lic sidewalks surrounding St. David’s church.85  Unlike the current
picketing of military funerals, the picketing in this case was conducted
for over a year during normal worship times.86  St. David’s argued that
Westboro’s activities infringed on its religious worship.87  Applying the
test articulated in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, the court examined
the articulated government interest.88  The court of appeals upheld
the trial court’s conclusion that a “place of worship ‘would place a
close second to one’s residence when it comes to the right to worship
and communicate with the maker of one’s choice in a tranquil, pri-
vate and serene environment.’”89  Just as there is a value in being left
alone during worship, there is equal value in being left alone during a
funeral or burial service.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1182.
83. Id. at 1185 (Bright, J., dissenting); see discussion infra Part V.B; see also Phelps, supra
note 76, at 300–05 (explaining the similarities between the church and home and the need R
for privacy in both, as well as further explaining the holding in Olmer); Stanley, supra note
11, at 290–95 (discussing both the majority and dissenting opinions in Olmer, and their R
reliance on the captive audience doctrine set forth in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988),
to support their positions).
84. St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821, 830
(Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
85. Id. at 824.
86. See id. (discussing St. David’s request for an injunction on June 13, 1994 to prevent
Westboro from picketing around the church during any religious event, a practice that
Westboro had been engaged in since March 1992).
87. Id. at 828–29.
88. Id. at 830.
89. Id.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 17 11-MAR-08 9:20
2008] A TIME TO MOURN 311
D. Other Significant Interests
There are other important governmental interests undermined
by funeral picketing.  Demonstrations and picketing can result in neg-
ative secondary effects like noise, traffic, and disorder.90
Another key interest articulated by legislation is the state’s inter-
est in minimizing public disruption.91  Funerals are traditionally
peaceful, dignified, and solemn occasions.  Dignity is a value that has
also been recognized by the courts.92  The state’s significant interest
in protecting the dignified nature of burial activities is legitimate as
well.
Funerals represent one of the few instances where the dignity and
purpose of the occasion can be destroyed by protesters.93  In a fu-
neral, the mourners’ interest is in solemnizing the event and showing
respect to the departed.  Unlike abortions, funerals tend to be out-
doors, thus making them particularly susceptible to disruption by
noise, signs, and chanting.  An abortion protester may cause emo-
tional distress to patients and unwilling listeners, but is unable to pre-
vent or disrupt the actual protested act—the abortion—by expressive
activity.  In contrast, a funeral protester could effectively disrupt a ser-
vice and interfere with the peaceful and solemn occasion of a funeral.
90. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1986) (upholding
a zoning ordinance regulating adult theatres where the predominate concern was not with
the content of the films but the secondary effects on the community); see also Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 573–74 (1942) (upholding a state’s right to regulate
the use of words in a public place likely to cause a “breach of the peace”); ERWIN CHEMERIN-
SKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1002 (3d ed. 2006) (noting the unlikelihood of success of a
fighting words law because the Supreme Court has failed to uphold a fighting words con-
viction without ever overruling Chaplinsky); Burton Caine, The Trouble With “Fighting Words”:
Chaplinski v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should be Overruled, 88
MARQ. L. REV. 441, 451, 536–38, 556 (2004) (noting that Chaplinsky should not be inter-
preted to include addresses to crowds and that the doctrine has been limited to punishing
critical speech against authoritative bodies like police officers); David L. Hudson Jr.,
What’s on the Horizon (Apr. 2006), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/Assembly/ho-
rizon.aspx?topic=assembly_horizon (discussing the improbability of a fighting words stat-
ute surviving, particularly in the funeral picketing context).
91. 152 CONG. REC. E774 (daily ed. May 10, 2006) (statement of Rep. Moore).
92. Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84
NEB. L. REV. 740, 757 (2006).
93. Albert Snyder described the impact of Westboro’s protest during his son’s funeral:
“I had one chance to bury my son and they took that away from me.” Margo Rutledge
Kisell, Father: military funeral protesters took away only chance to bury his son, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 2, 2008, available at http://www.daytondailynews.com/n/content/oh/story/
new/local/2008/02/02/ddn020208picket.html.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF FUNERAL PICKETING LEGISLATION
A. Scrutiny of Speech in a Public Forum
Balancing the right of free speech against the right to mourn in
funeral picketing cases is impacted by location and the application of
public forum analysis.  Funeral picketing often occurs in public areas,
like sidewalks across from funerals, and not on the premises of ceme-
teries or other funeral locations.94  Public streets are considered the
quintessential public forum.95  As two scholars jointly explained:
Open public spaces like parks, sidewalks, streets, and other
accessible government-owned properties have served as the
most effective and reliable arena of communication for all
citizens regardless of their political ideology, private wealth,
property ownership, social status, or popularity.  This is why
the traditional public forum has been called the “poor man’s
printing press.”96
The government’s ability to restrict speech in a public forum is
limited.97  The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he right of free
speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of
willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their
attention.”98  The First Amendment has been an essential tool in pro-
tecting the controversial, marginal, and politically weak.99  Thus, while
Westboro is controversial, it still has a right to broadcast its message.
It is through exposure to the marketplace of ideas that thoughts,
94. One of the determining factors of a public forum is whether it has been open for
expressive activity.  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).  The constitutional scrutiny is less when the location involves public property that
is not traditionally or by designation a non-public forum. Id. at 46.  Cemeteries do not
have the same historical relationship with speech as public streets and have not been tradi-
tionally open for expressive activity such as picketing or demonstrations. See, e.g., Visitors
Rules for Arlington National Cemetery, 32 C.F.R. § 553.22(e) (1977) (prohibiting demon-
strations, picketing, orations, and the display of placards, banners, and foreign flags).
95. See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
96. Raskin & LeBlanc, supra note 56, at 180–81. R
97. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (noting that in public places, “which oc-
cupy a ‘special position in terms of First Amendment protection,’ the government’s ability
to restrict expressive activity ‘is very limited.’” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983))).
98. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (plurality opinion).
99. See Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’s Free Speech Jurispru-
dence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2203 (2006) (noting that the First Amendment serves the
need of open discourse in a democracy by protecting marginal voices with distinctive per-
spectives); see also Raskin & LeBlanc, supra note 56, at 199 (warning that courts using a R
more relaxed standard of review for seemingly content-neutral statutes increase the likeli-
hood that “speech will be less free for the politically weak, the controversial, the marginal,
and all those who depend on public fora to communicate”).
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morals, and opinions develop and change.100  Although picketing on
a public sidewalk is constitutionally protected behavior,101 the idea of
picketing a funeral is inherently offensive, regardless of the message
being communicated, because it disrupts a solemn event.  The govern-
ment should not try to silence Westboro’s message, no matter how
offensive, but it can impose reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tions in order to protect significant or important competing
interests.102
When legislation is challenged in court, the threshold question
for determining constitutionality is the level of judicial scrutiny to ap-
ply.  Restrictions on speech based on the content of the message must
be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, requiring a showing of a com-
pelling government interest, while restrictions based on the time,
place, and manner of the message are subjected to intermediate scru-
tiny and need only show a significant government interest.103  Con-
tent-based restrictions are presumptively invalid,104 thus escaping the
content-based label is essential for any of the funeral picketing statutes
to survive.105  To determine whether the laws are content based or
100. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to be-
lieve . . . that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . . . .”).  It is not clear, however, that Westboro’s speech contrib-
utes to the marketplace.  The speech of Westboro is not meant to inform and educate as
much as enrage and insult. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 13 (reporting that Westboro dem- R
onstrators held placards at a funeral reading “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and kicked
around an American flag, shouting that the dead soldiers were rotting in hell).  There is
very little that is informative about picketing a funeral.  The message delivered is not in-
tended as a statement on the war, politics, the president, the deceased, or the survivors.
Rather it is a statement of condemnation of a country Westboro believes is being punished
for not condemning homosexuality. Id.  A funeral is not a venue where conflicting ideas
and beliefs are exchanged.  A funeral is a venue to mourn.
101. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 176–77 (stating that peaceful picketing is speech protected by
the First Amendment and that sidewalks are considered public fora for which government
restrictions on expressive conduct are very limited).
102. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 331 (upholding the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting
picketing within 500 feet of official foreign embassies because “it merely regulates the
place and manner of certain demonstrations”).
103. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 90, at 932–33 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 R
(1994)) (distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral restrictions).
104. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
382 (1992)).
105. A content-based restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)); see
also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 41, at 591.  Very few statutes can survive this type of R
strict judicial scrutiny. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 735 (2000) (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (concluding that “the government is held to a very exacting and rarely satisfied stan-
dard” when enacting content-based restrictions).
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content neutral, courts apply the standard articulated in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism.106
As the Supreme Court stated in Ward, “[t]he principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time,
place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the mes-
sage it conveys.”107 Ward involved a time, place, and manner regula-
tion of sound-amplification at a park bandshell.108  A concert sponsor
challenged the regulation as unconstitutional.109  The regulation re-
quired all concert sponsors to use city sound amplification equipment
and technicians.110  The court of appeals concluded that the regula-
tion was invalid because it was not the least intrusive method to regu-
late the sound.111  The Supreme Court reversed and explained that
the “less-restrictive-alternative analysis” is not part of the test to deter-
mine if a time, place, and manner regulation is valid.112  Under Ward,
a regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech must be content
neutral, and narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate government inter-
est, but “it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of
doing so.”113  The regulation should also leave open ample alternative
means of communication.114
B. The Legislative Response to Funeral Picketing
1. Federal Legislation
Legislators across the country have tried to balance the rights of
mourners with the rights of protesters.  The recent federal and state
legislation to date imposes varied time, place, and manner restrictions
on funeral picketing.  On May 29, 2006, Congress enacted the Respect
for America’s Fallen Heroes Act (RAFHA).115  RAFHA prohibits dem-
106. See 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))
(explaining that determining content neutrality depends on the government’s purpose in
adopting the regulation—a content-neutral regulation is a regulation that serves a purpose
unrelated to the content of the expression).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 784.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 789.
112. Id. at 797, 803 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 657 (1984) (plurality
opinion)).
113. Id. at 798.
114. Id.
115. Pub. L. No. 109-228, 120 Stat. 387 (2006) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (West Supp.
2007)).  A second proposed federal statute, The Dignity for Military Funerals Act of 2006,
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onstrations at funerals controlled by the National Cemetery Adminis-
tration and Arlington National Cemetery.116  The legislative history
clearly indicates that Westboro’s picketing activities were the primary
motivation for the legislation.  As Senator Larry Craig explained, the
Act “was conceived in response to hateful, intolerant demonstrations
taking place at the funeral services of deceased servicemembers of the
global war on terror.”117  Congressman Dennis Moore expressed simi-
lar sentiments in his speech when RAFHA was being considered:
I find it abhorrent that individuals and groups feel a military
funeral is an appropriate forum to display their beliefs on
gay rights. . . . It is unfortunate that some individuals and
groups add to the anguish and grief of those who have lost a
loved one by protesting outside of the funerals of fallen
soldiers.118
Although the legislation is clearly targeted at a particular group,
it makes no reference to the specific content of the picketing activity;
rather, the legislative history and the text of the Act suggest the pri-
mary concern was the impact the activity was having on the place of
the protest, the funeral attendees, and the dignity of the funeral.119
S. 2452, 109th Cong. (2006), has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and is
beyond the scope of this Article.
116. 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (West Supp. 2007).  The federal legislation is distinct from the
state legislation because the federal legislation is limited to cemeteries under the control of
the National Cemetery Administration, like Arlington. Id.; see Warren v. Fairfax County,
196 F.3d 186, 200–02 (4th Cir. 1999) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (drawing distinctions be-
tween the characteristics of a public and non-public forum and concluding that public
cemeteries are not public fora); Visitor’s Rules for the Arlington National Cemetery, 32
C.F.R. § 553.22 (1977) (noting that Arlington is not like a sidewalk or a place traditionally
open for expressive activity; in fact, Arlington prohibits expressive activity like picketing,
orations, solicitations, and placards); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 38, 46 (1983) (discussing that the regulation of speech in a non-public
forum needs only to be reasonably related to a legitimate interest).
117. 152 CONG. REC. S5129 (daily ed. May 24, 2006) (statement of Sen. Craig); see also
152 CONG. REC. E774 (daily ed. May 10, 2006) (statement of Rep. Moore).  In some in-
stances, Westboro was identified by name. Id.
118. 152 CONG. REC. E774 (daily ed. May 10, 2006) (statement of Rep. Moore).
119. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (prohibiting demonstrations on properties controlled by the
National Cemetery Administration or on Arlington National Cemetery’s property, demon-
strations taking place within 150 feet of any route to and from cemetery property, and
demonstrations within 300 feet of the cemetery and impeding access to the cemetery 60
minutes before a funeral until 60 minutes after a funeral); 153 CONG. REC. S5129 (daily ed.
May 24, 2006) (statement of Sen. Craig) (arguing that there should be greater restrictions
on demonstrations the closer a funeral procession is to the cemetery in order “to ensure a
dignified, solemn, and respectful burial at our national shrines”); 152 CONG. REC. E774
(daily ed. May 10, 2006) (statement of Rep. Moore) (stating that losing a family member
during war is already hard, and this pain should not be magnified by the presence of
protestors at funerals).
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The Act prohibits demonstrations “beginning 60 minutes before
and ending 60 minutes after a funeral, memorial service, or cere-
mony” that occur “within 150 feet of a road, pathway, or other route
of ingress to or egress from” the property.120  The 150-foot buffer
zone applies to demonstrations that create noise or may disturb the
peace.121  RAFHA also prohibits demonstrations within 300 feet of the
cemetery that “impede[ ] the access to or egress from” the ceme-
tery.122  In addition to expressing outrage towards Westboro for its
activities, the Act includes a provision encouraging states to enact sim-
ilar legislation.123
2. State Legislation
The federal legislation focused on the negative effect picketing
could have on grieving families—not on content of the protesters’ ac-
tual message.124  State legislative bodies have taken similar ap-
proaches, criticizing Westboro for its impact on families and
disruption of services, but not criticizing its message or its right to
communicate it.125  Over twenty-nine states enacted separate anti-
funeral-picketing statutes or broadened preexisting disorderly con-
duct statutes.126  Most of the statutes prohibit picketing funerals
within a certain distance, and picketing during a certain time period
before, during, and after a funeral.127
One of the first known funeral picketing statutes was from
Westboro’s home state of Kansas.128  The Kansas funeral picketing
120. 38 U.S.C. § 2413.  Funerals on property controlled by the National Cemetery Ad-
ministration are typically conducted at committal shelters.  152 CONG. REC. S5129 (daily
ed. May 24, 2006) (statement of Sen. Craig).  Committal shelters tend to be at least 300
feet from property lines and obstructed by trees and shrubs. Id.  Consequently it would be
difficult to actually disrupt a funeral on government property, and more likely the disrup-
tion would occur while the funeral party is approaching or exiting the funeral site. Id.
121. 38 U.S.C. § 2413.
122. Id.
123. Specifically the provision reads that “[i]t is the sense of Congress that each State
should enact legislation to restrict demonstrations near any military funeral.”  Pub. L. No.
109-228, 120 Stat. 387 (2006).
124. See 152 CONG. REC. E774 (daily ed. May 10, 2006) (statement of Rep. Moore) (ex-
pressing concern for the families of fallen soldiers in having to experience added anguish
because of funeral protesting).
125. See infra Appendix.
126. The Delaware and Florida statutes are limited to restricting picketing at military
funerals, while the other states impose similar time, place and manner restrictions on pick-
eting any funerals. See infra Appendix.
127. See discussion infra Part V.C.
128. See Megan Dunn, The Right to Rest in Peace: Missouri Prohibits Protesting at Funerals, 71
MO. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (2006) (noting that even though funeral picketing only recently
has been a subject of national attention, Kansas enacted an anti-picketing statute in 1992);
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statute was found unconstitutionally vague by a federal district court
because it failed to define what was meant by “before or after” a fu-
neral.129  The statute has since been amended to prohibit funeral
picketing during a definite time period of one hour before and two
hours after a funeral.130
The statutes in Delaware and Nebraska mirror the time period of
the Kansas Funeral Picketing Act of one hour before and two hours
after a funeral.131  Illinois and South Carolina impose restrictions of
thirty minutes before and after a funeral,132 while the majority of state
statutes and the federal statute impose restrictions of one hour before
and one hour after.133  The majority of the state statutes impose dis-
tance restrictions from 500 to 1,000 feet.134  Only eight states enacted
legislation with distance requirements of 300 feet or less.135
The consistent reference to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions in the text of the statutes shows that legislative bodies in-
tended for the statutes to be content neutral and subject to intermedi-
ate scrutiny.  Whether the statutes will actually be considered content
neutral by the courts is an unresolved issue.136
Hudson, Funeral Protests, supra note 16 (explaining that in 1992 Kansas passed the Kansas R
Funeral Picketing Act in response to Westboro’s activities).
129. Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997); Hudson, Funeral Pro-
tests, supra note 16. R
130. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (1995).
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.03 (2006).
132. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-6 (West. Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-525
(2006).
133. 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (West Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2007); IOWA
CODE § 723.5 (West Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. § 609.501 (West Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-35-18 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.501 (West Supp. 2007); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:33-8.1 (West Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4 (Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3767.30 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380 (West Supp.
2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-13-17,
22-13-19 (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon Supp. 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 947.011 (West Supp. 2006).
134. See infra note 277 and accompanying text (noting thirteen of the eighteen state R
statutes set distance restrictions of 500 to 1,000 feet).
135. See infra note 279 and accompanying text (noting three state statutes requiring only R
a distance of 100 feet and five state statutes requiring 300 feet).
136. Four courts that have analyzed funeral picketing statutes have concluded that the
legislation is content neutral. See discussion and accompanying notes infra Part IV.E. (dis-
cussing the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri’s decision in Phelps-
Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691 (W.D. Mo. 2007), the Eighth Circuit’s reversal in Phelps-
Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky’s decision in McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006),
and the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio’s decision in Phelps-Roper
v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612 (N.D. Ohio 2007)).
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3. The Facial Neutrality of the Legislation
Determining whether a law is content based or content neutral
may be challenging because some statutes are both.137  To determine
if legislation is content based the court will focus on the government’s
purpose by examining the text of the statute, the government’s stated
interests, and the legislative history.138
The funeral picketing statutes will probably be considered con-
tent neutral.  In spite of targeted comments by legislators regarding
Westboro, there is no mention of suppressing Westboro’s message in
the legislative history, press releases, or actual statutes.  Rather, states
have expressed concern over the time, place, and manner of the mes-
sage.139  The federal and state governments’ articulated interests are
unrelated to the content of Westboro’s speech.  Indeed, the universal
issue identified by the different statutes has been the effect of picket-
ing on the bereaved.140  The state’s interest in protecting the privacy
of grieving families and maintaining the peace and dignity of funerals
is unrelated to the content of Westboro’s speech.  Thus, facially, the
federal and state laws are content neutral.  The funeral picketing stat-
utes focus on the location of Westboro’s speech instead of the mes-
sage.141  The statutes attempt to regulate the places where speech may
occur, not the speech itself.  Similar to the abortion buffer zone cases,
a court would probably conclude that the statutes were not enacted
because of disagreement with Westboro’s message, but with their dis-
ruptive conduct.
C. Targeted Legislation & Content Neutrality
Westboro could argue that the legislation is content based be-
cause Westboro is the target of the legislation, and it was enacted to
137. Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and
Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 806 (2004).  In fact,
the federal district court in Kentucky concluded the Kentucky statute was “motivated by
both content-based and content-neutral factors.”  McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d
975, 985 (E.D. Ky. 2006).  Ultimately, that issue was decided for the Kentucky statute in
favor of content neutrality. Id.
138. McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 983.
139. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (examining the text of funeral picketing R
statutes).
140. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (examining the text of funeral picketing R
statutes).
141. The stated purpose of the regulations, to protect the grieving families and preserve
the peace and dignity of funerals, has nothing to do with Westboro’s message of Americans
going to hell or God’s wrath because of homosexuality.  Westboro’s message can still be
communicated, just not during stated periods before and after a funeral.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 25 11-MAR-08 9:20
2008] A TIME TO MOURN 319
silence them or a particular form of expression.142  The targeted na-
ture of the legislation is evidenced by the comments by numerous
state officials.143  Legislatures, however, can target a group or activity
142. If funeral picketing is seen as a unique medium or form of expression, an argu-
ment could be made that the legislation is attempting to silence this specific form of com-
munication, consequently making the legislation content-based.  While picketing is
considered an effective form of protest because of the low costs involved and the publicity
it generates, Stanley, supra note 11, at 277, the Court noted in Frisby that prohibiting a R
medium or form of expression may be necessary in some instances. See Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810
(1984), in which the Court upheld an ordinance banning all signs on public property
because the medium of expression itself was the source of the problem the City hoped to
address).  Patti Stanley argues, “as picketing becomes more focused or targeted, the coer-
cive aspects of this form of expressive activity create a tension between picketers’ right to
free speech and the privacy rights of those they are trying to influence.”  Stanley, supra
note 11, at 277–78.  Funeral picketing should not be considered a special form of expres- R
sion, but an offensive application of the well-established form, picketing.  There is nothing
unique about funerals truly central to Westboro’s message.  The picketing of clinics and
health care facilities by abortion and anti-abortion protesters is arguably reasonably related
to the picketer’s message.  The picketing of funerals, however, is not reasonably related to
a message against homosexuality, particularly when Westboro protests military funerals re-
gardless of the sexual orientation or religious beliefs of the deceased.  Westboro has exhib-
ited a pattern of protesting at events that have an indirect, if any, connection to its
message.  The sensationalism involved with funeral picketing has produced an indirect
outlet to Westboro’s actual targeted audiences—the media.  A prime example of this was
Westboro’s planned protest at the funeral of the tragically murdered Amish school chil-
dren.  See Press Release, Pennsylvania School Girls, supra note 30.  Westboro ultimately R
cancelled the protest in exchange for media time. Id.  Westboro claimed that the children
were murdered because God was punishing the governor for trying to curtain Westboro’s
First Amendment rights. Id.  Instead of planning the protest at the governor’s mansion or
the courthouse, the group chose an event that would receive the most media attention.
Arguably, Westboro’s rejoicing over the death of a soldier does not contribute to the mar-
ketplace of ideas meant to be protected by the First Amendment.  Westboro’s web page
describing the organization states clearly that it views fallen soldiers as evidence of God’s
wrath against homosexuality, and that it demonstrates against the “modern militant homo-
sexual movement,” not against the war. See Westboro, Home Page, supra note 19.  Because R
of the generality of Westboro’s message about America, it could be effectively communi-
cated at countless venues other than funerals.
143. For example, Missouri Governor Matt Blunt stated, “[i]t is offensive that groups
would attempt to spread a message of hate as families and friends grieve the loss of a loved
one.  No family should have to endure such hardship.”  Press Release, Matt Blunt, Gover-
nor of Missouri, Blunt Signs Law Shielding Mourners; Ending Funeral Protests (July 5,
2006), http://www.gov.mo.gov/press/HB1026070506.htm.  Oklahoma Senator Mary Eas-
ley, sponsor of the Oklahoma Funeral Picketing Act, stated, “I want these groups to know
that there is a proper time and place for staging a protest, but during a funeral isn’t one of
them.”  Press Release, Mary Easley, Senator, Oklahoma State Senate, Easley Files Bill to
Protect Families from Funeral Protests (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/
press_releases/press_releases_2006/pr20060202a.html.  In another press release Senator
Easley stated, “I hope this finally stops those protesters and lets families mourn their loved
ones in peace,” and, “These picketers need to realize what they have been doing at funerals
is wrong. . . .  If they violate this law, they can expect to the [sic] face the legal conse-
quences.”  Press Release, Mary Easley, Senator, Oklahoma State Senate, Easley Applauds
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without the legislation being content based as long as the governmen-
tal purpose for enacting the legislation is unrelated to the content of
the message.144  The press releases and legislative record suggest a
clear disdain for the group’s behavior.145  The disdain does not ap-
pear to be towards the group’s viewpoint about the war, homosexual-
ity, heaven or hell; rather, the disdain is based on the group’s decision
to antagonize individuals during the universally difficult human expe-
rience of mourning.146  One of the most critical descriptions of
Westboro was drafted in the Preamble of Kentucky’s legislation.147  It
states in part:
WHEREAS, certain despicable individuals have been dis-
rupting the funerals of soldiers who died while serving in the
United States Armed Forces; and WHEREAS, these disrup-
tions have taken such forms as shouting insults at the parents
of the fallen; and WHEREAS, the military dead and their
families deserve respect and compassion; and WHEREAS, all
mourners should be left in peace . . . .148
The Kentucky statute clearly reflects an animus towards
Westboro.149  Based on the Preamble, the Kentucky statute was en-
acted due to a concern for the impact of the picketing on mourning
families.  When the various state statutes identified a purpose, it was
related to either the privacy and emotional disturbance of grieving
families or the peace and dignity of the funeral.150  The right to
Governor Henry for Signing Picketing Measure (Mar. 3, 2006), http://www.oksenate.gov/
news/press_releases/press_releases_2006/pr20060303c.html.
144. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (stating that an
injunction limited to “people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the injunc-
tion content or viewpoint based”); Stanley, supra note 11, at 279 (explaining that regula- R
tions that incidentally affect some speakers may nonetheless be considered content neutral
if their purpose is not related to the speech’s content).
145. See supra note 143; infra notes 147–148 and accompanying text. R
146. 152 CONG. REC. S5129 (daily ed. May 24, 2006) (statement of Sen. Craig); 152
CONG. REC. E774 (daily ed. May 10, 2006) (statement of Rep. Moore).
147. The Kentucky statute was found unconstitutionally broad by a federal district court,
and its enforcement was enjoined.  McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 997–98
(E.D. Ky. 2006); see also infra Part IV.E (discussing the federal district court’s opinion in
McQueary).
148. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.055 (West Supp. 2006).
149. To date, Kentucky is one of three states that have been challenged in court over the
funeral picketing legislation. See McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 976–77 (challenging the
Kentucky funeral picketing statute); Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693–94
(W.D. Mo. 2007), rev’d, 509 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007) (challenging the Missouri funeral
picketing statute); Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (challeng-
ing the Ohio funeral picketing statute).
150. See, e.g., The Right to Rest in Peace Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-125 (West
Supp. 2006) (“[I]t is necessary to enact this act in order to: (a) Protect the privacy of
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mourn and concern for the emotional distress of citizens burying
their loved ones should be viewed as a significant governmental
interest.151
grieving families and others who are entering, attending, or leaving a funeral; (b) Preserve
the peaceful character of funerals and funeral sites; and (c) Allow for a sufficient distance
away from a funeral site so that mourners can be assured that the funeral is not disrupted
by violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud, or otherwise disor-
derly conduct.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (a) (2007) (“[T]he interest of persons in
planning, participating in, and attending a funeral or memorial service for a deceased
relative or loved one without unwanted impediment, disruption, disturbance, or interfer-
ence, is a substantial interest . . . .”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-6 (West Supp. 2007)
(“[D]ue to the unique nature of funeral and memorial services and the heightened oppor-
tunity for extreme emotional distress on such occasions, the purpose of this Section is to
protect the privacy and ability to mourn of grieving families directly before, during, and
after a funeral or memorial service.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015(2)-(3) (1995) (“[T]he
interests of families in privately and peacefully mourning the loss of deceased relatives are
violated when funerals are targeted for picketing . . . picketing of funerals causes emo-
tional disturbance and distress to grieving families . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.01
(2006) (“[F]amilies have a legitimate and legally cognizable interest in organizing and
attending funerals for deceased relatives and . . . the rights of families to peacefully and
privately mourn the death of relatives are violated when funerals are targeted for picketing
or protest activities. . . .  [T]he purposes . . . are to protect the privacy of grieving families
and to preserve the peaceful character of cemeteries, mortuaries, churches, and other
places of worship during a funeral while still providing picketers and protesters the oppor-
tunity to communicate their message at a time and place that minimizes the interference
with the rights of funeral participants.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1(a-d) (2006) (“a. Fami-
lies have a substantial interest in attending funeral services for their loved ones; b. The
interest of families in privately and peacefully mourning the loss of their relatives are vio-
lated when funerals are targeted for disruption, picketing and other demonstrations; c.
Such disruption causes emotional disturbance and distress to grieving families; and d. It is
in the interest of the State of New Jersey to protect families’ privacy immediately prior to,
during and after a funeral service.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380 (A)(1)(a)–(c) (West
Supp. 2007) (“a. it is generally recognized that families have a substantial interest in or-
ganizing and attending funerals for deceased relatives, b. the interests of families in pri-
vately and peacefully mourning the loss of deceased relatives are violated when funerals are
targeted for picketing and other public demonstrations, c. picketing of funerals causes
emotional disturbance and distress to grieving families . . . .”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7517 (West Supp. 2007) (“(1) Families have a substantial interest in organizing and at-
tending commemorative services for deceased relatives.  (2) The interests of families in
privately and peacefully mourning the loss of deceased relatives are violated when com-
memorative services are targeted for picketing and other public demonstrations.  (3) Pick-
eting of commemorative services causes emotional disturbance and distress to grieving
families who participate in commemorative services.  (4) Full opportunity exists under the
terms and provisions of this section for the exercise of freedom of speech and other consti-
tutional rights at times other than within one hour prior to, during and one hour following
the commemorative services.”).
151. Local governments are also justified in enacting anti-funeral-picketing legislation
based on concern for the negative effects of the picketing—like noise and traffic—on an
event that is typically solemn. Cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47–48
(1986) (recognizing secondary effects as a content-neutral basis for upholding ordinance).
Even if the statutes are facially content-based they may still be considered content-neutral if
they are motivated by a content-neutral purpose, like the negative secondary effects of the
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If the statutes are considered content neutral, a court will analyze
whether the statutes are “narrowly tailored” to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest and whether ample alternative means for commu-
nication exist.152
D. Application of Legislation to Counter-Demonstrations
Westboro has argued that the statutes are content based because
if the picketing signs were in favor of the deceased, the legislation
would never have been enacted.  Facially, the funeral picketing stat-
utes can be applied to all demonstrations.  For legislation to survive
constitutional scrutiny it must be content and viewpoint neutral both
facially and as applied.153  This raises the special issue of the Patriot
Guard Riders.
The Patriot Guard Riders are a group of motorcycle riders who
have formed to produce counter-demonstrations in response to
Westboro.154  The application of the statutes to the Patriot Guard Rid-
ers is somewhat ironic because they are frequently welcomed by the
families155 and attend most military funerals with the express purpose
of drowning out Westboro’s message with their presence and the
sound of their motorcycle engines.156  The primary differences be-
tween the Patriot Guard Riders and Westboro are their messages and
motives.
Legislation geared towards exempting the Patriot Guard Riders
would be blatant viewpoint discrimination.  The same concerns for
disruption, noise, and traffic would apply to both Westboro and the
Patriot Guard Riders.  Although there have been many supporters of
the Patriot Guard Riders for their efforts in shielding the families,157
there may be some unwilling listeners who do not wish to hear patri-
picketing. See id. (holding an ordinance aimed at the secondary effects of adult theaters as
“completely consistent with our definition of ‘content-neutral’ speech”).
152. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
153. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000) (quoting Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d
1246, 1256 (Colo. 1999) (en banc)) (upholding a Colorado statute because the statute’s
restrictions applied equally to all demonstrators and the language of the statute made no
reference to the speech’s content).
154. Alvarez, supra note 13; McDonough, supra note 17, at 18. R
155. See McDonough, supra note 17, at 18 (quoting an organizer for the Patriot Guard R
Riders as saying, “Since we are invited guests of the family, we consider ourselves part of
the service”).
156. Alvarez, supra note 13. R
157. See id. (noting that “[h]undreds of well-wishers have written e-mail messages to
members of the motorcycle group, thanking them for their presence at the funerals”).
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otic music, chants, or motorcycle sounds before entering a funeral.158
Although the Patriot Guard Riders claim to be invited guests,159 it
would be very difficult to draft content-neutral legislation that would
make an exception for their appearance.  The current funeral picket-
ing legislation was clearly developed with uninvited guests in mind.
E. Recent Constitutional Challenges
Some states have already faced constitutional challenges to the
funeral picketing legislation.  In Phelps-Roper v. Nixon,160 the plaintiff,
attorney, and daughter of Westboro’s founder, filed a preliminary in-
junction against Missouri’s anti-funeral-picketing statute.161  Mis-
souri’s statute criminalizes picketing “in front of or about” a
funeral.162  In the event the first section is found unconstitutional, a
separate statutory section criminalizes picketing within 300 feet of a
funeral.163
The district court denied the preliminary injunction and con-
cluded that the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits; how-
ever, the Eighth Circuit disagreed.164  To determine the likelihood of
success on the merits the district court had to evaluate the constitu-
tionality of Missouri’s funeral picketing statute.165
First, the district court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
statute was content based, although the statute was motivated in re-
sponse to Westboro’s activities.166  The court concluded that the stat-
ute was content neutral and recognized the government’s interest in
“protecting the rights of Missouri citizens to be free from interference
by other citizens while they mourn the death of friends or family.”167
Without further discussion, the court concluded that the plaintiff
failed to prove a likelihood of succeeding in her argument that the
state did not have a significant government interest.168
158. See id. (describing a military family who asked the Riders not to attend their son’s
funeral).
159. McDonough, supra note 17, at 18. R
160. 504 F. Supp. 2d 691 (W.D. Mo. 2007), rev’d, 509 F.3d 480, 488 (8th Cir. 2007).
161. Id. at 694.
162. MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.501 (West Supp. 2007).
163. MO. REV. STAT. § 578.502 (Supp. 2006).
164. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
165. Id. at 695–97.
166. Id. at 695.
167. Id. at 696.  The court also recognized the defendants’ assertion of the captive audi-
ence doctrine and an argument in an amicus brief regarding funeral attendees’ First
Amendment right to exercise their religion. Id.
168. Id.
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The district court did not address the specific 300-foot distance
and instead focused on the provision that prohibited picketing “in
front of or about” a funeral.169  The court concluded that the statute
was narrowly tailored because the language was similar to the lan-
guage upheld by the Supreme Court in Frisby v. Schultz.170  The district
court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the statute was vague
and overbroad.171  The court concluded that although there were un-
defined terms in the statute, they all had “plain meanings that a per-
son of ordinary intelligence could clearly ascertain.”172
The district court’s holding in Nixon is troubling.  The court cor-
rectly recognized the interests in mourning but wrongly decided the
issue of vagueness and overbreadth.  The disputed provision of “in
front of or about” fails to give guidance on where protesters can exer-
cise their rights of free speech.173  Although the Missouri statute uses
the “in front of” language that was utilized in Frisby, the “or about”
provision is unique to the Missouri statute.174  In Frisby, the Court
targeted picketing “focused on, and taking place in front of, a particu-
lar residence.”175
According to the plaintiff’s brief, Westboro contacted local au-
thorities for guidance on the “in front of or about” description.176
Conflicting responses were given that included the parking lot of a
funeral, 100 feet from the church entrance, “on the other side of
169. Id. at 695–96.
170. Id. at 696–97 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477, 488 (1988) (upholding a
ban on picketing “before or about the residence”)).  In Frisby, the Supreme Court con-
strued the local ordinance as prohibiting picketing “focused on, and taking place in front
of, a particular residence.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482.
171. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
172. Id. The plaintiff also filed a motion to enjoin the prosecuting attorney from en-
forcing the statute in an overly broad manner. Id.  The prosecuting attorney informed the
plaintiff that the statute applied to all picketing within one hour of a funeral and protests
were allowed 400 feet away from the funeral. Id. at 698.  The prosecuting attorney did not
respond to the motion for preliminary injunction and instead entered a stipulation where
he essentially agreed not to enforce Missouri’s funeral picketing statute. Id.  The plaintiff
agreed to withdraw the motion for preliminary injunction once a consent judgment was
entered. Id.  The court declined to rule on the preliminary injunction or the proposed
consent judgment until a final judgment was entered. Id. at 698–99.
173. See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966) (“It is established that a
law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standard-
less that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits. . . .”).
174. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.501 (West Supp. 2007); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 477.
175. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482.
176. Suggestions in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction to Prevent Defend-
ants Nixon and Blunt from Enforcing § 578.501 at 5, Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp.
2d 691 (W.D. Mo. 2007) (No. 06-4156-CV-C-NKL).
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town,” and 400 feet.177  The arbitrary and conflicting interpretations
of the provision undermine the court’s conclusion that a person of
reasonable intelligence would know the meaning of the terms.178  The
“in front of or about” language in the Missouri statute fails to give
proper notice to protesters.  Consequently, the proper location where
Westboro may picket in Missouri remains a mystery.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial
of Westboro’s preliminary injunction.179  Without determining the
constitutionality of the statute, the court concluded that Phelps-Roper
had a fair chance of showing that the Missouri statute was facially over-
broad or not narrowly tailored.180  The appellate court agreed with
the lower court’s conclusion that the statute was content neutral.181
Interestingly, the appellate court was not swayed by the legislative his-
tory and concluded that the legislature’s motivation for enactment
was irrelevant because the statute is facially neutral.182  Similar to its
decision in Olmer, the Eighth Circuit declined to extend Frisby beyond
the residential context.183  The Eighth Circuit failed to elaborate on
why Frisby should be limited other than stating “we choose to draw the
line in such a way as to give maximum possible protection to
speech . . . .”184  The Eighth Circuit missed an important opportunity
to clarify the rights of unwilling listeners.  In a misguided attempt to
protect free speech, the court wrongly assumed that speech automati-
cally trumped the rights of unwilling listeners.  In fact, Frisby and an
extension of the captive audience doctrine would properly balance
the right of free speech against the rights of mourners.185
The federal district court in Kentucky reached a different result.
In McQueary v. Stumbo,186 the plaintiff, a supporter of Westboro, filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction to challenge some of the provi-
sions of the Kentucky statute.187  The court concluded that the provi-
sions were unconstitutionally overbroad and enjoined
enforcement.188  The challenged provisions prohibited picketing
177. Id. at 5–6.
178. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
179. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007).
180. Id. at 488.
181. Id. at 485.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 486-87 (concluding that the home is “unique”); see also Olmer v. Lincoln, 192
F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999) discussed in Part III.C.
184. Nixon, 509 F.3d at 487.
185. See discussion infra Part V.B.
186. 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
187. Id. at 976–77.
188. Id. at 997–98.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 32 11-MAR-08 9:20
326 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:295
within 300 feet of a funeral and prohibited displaying observable
images, sounds, chanting, or singing without authorization of the fam-
ily members.189  The court addressed the initial inquiry of the correct
level of scrutiny to apply.190  The court concluded that the statute was
content neutral in spite of the clear motivations to respond to
Westboro’s activities.191  The court reasoned that the statute con-
tained both content-neutral and content-based aspects, but the
predominate purpose of the statute was the content-neutral purpose
of preventing interference with funerals and protecting unwilling lis-
teners.192  The court concluded that intermediate scrutiny applied,
and it found that “[t]he state . . . has a significant interest in prohibit-
ing interference with funerals.”193
The court wrestled with the application of Hill v. Colorado and the
interests of unwilling listeners in the context of funerals.194  The 300-
foot distance requirement was held to be not narrowly tailored and
the court stated that it “burden[ed] substantially more speech
than . . . necessary” because the 300-foot distance could impact com-
munication unrelated to the funeral and was substantially broader
than distances the Supreme Court has upheld in protest cases.195
The court’s decision in McQueary is well-supported by Supreme
Court precedent.  Although the court struggled with the application
of Hill and the interests of unwilling listeners, it ultimately “assumed”
that the state’s interest was valid.196  While the preamble to the Ken-
tucky statute probably received applause from constituents, it was
poorly drafted, and gratuitous comments regarding “certain despica-
ble individuals” were ultimately used against the state to argue that the
statute was content based.197  The Kentucky legislation was also one of
the few statutes that failed to include specific time provisions.198 More-
over, the 300-foot distance was excessive.199
189. Id. at 977–78.
190. Id. at 981–86.
191. Id. at 985.
192. Id. at 985–86.
193. Id. at 987.
194. Id. at 991–92.
195. Id. at 995–96.  The court also found a provision regarding distributing literature
“[w]ith no geographic restriction” overbroad. Id. at 996.
196. Id. at 992.
197. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
198. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.055, 525.145 & 525.155 (West Supp. 2006); see also infra
Appendix.
199. McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 995–96.
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Ohio’s statute was also challenged in Phelps-Roper v. Taft.200  The
Ohio statute prohibits “[p]icketing . . . within three hundred feet of
any . . . establishment during or within one hour before or one hour
after the conducting of an actual funeral or burial service at that
place.”201  The statute also has a floating buffer zone provision which
prohibits picketing within 300 feet of a funeral procession.202
In Taft, the plaintiff conceded that Ohio’s statute was facially con-
tent neutral but attacked it as not being narrowly tailored or leaving
open alternative channels.203  The court concluded that Ohio has a
significant interest in protecting mourners and recognized them as a
captive audience under Frisby.204  The district court also held that the
300-foot fixed buffer zone that prohibited protest activities within 300
feet of a funeral was narrowly tailored, but the 300-foot floating zone
was not.  The court decided to sever the floating buffer zone provision
and deny the plaintiff’s request for injunction.205
Although the court accurately decided that mourners are a cap-
tive audience, its ultimate conclusion regarding the fixed buffer zone
of 300 feet is unsupported.  The 300-foot distance will probably be
revisited by an appellate court.
The 300-foot distance requirement is not reasonably related to
Ohio’s or Kentucky’s stated interest.  States with outlandish distance
requirements of 1,000 feet or more are particularly disturbing.  There
is a huge delta between the distances upheld in prior Supreme Court
decisions and the 300- to 1,000-feet provisions that have been enacted
in the majority of the funeral picketing statutes.206 The legislatures in
Kentucky, Ohio, and other jurisdictions do not protect their citizens
by drafting clearly unconstitutional statutes and spending tax dollars
on inevitable litigation.
States that have enacted funeral picketing legislation should be
applauded for their efforts to protect mourners; however, most of the
legislation is vulnerable to overbroad challenges.  Funeral picketing is
such an emotional issue that judges and legislatures may be tempted
to effectively silence Westboro’s message by trying to place the group
as far as humanly possible from the mourners, hence some statutes
have passed legislation as broad as 1,000 feet.207  The government can
200. Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
201. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
202. Id.
203. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
204. Id. at 618–19.
205. Id. at 620.
206. See discussion infra Part V.C.2.
207. See infra note 277 and accompanying text. R
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and should protect mourners, but it cannot insulate them for an in-
definite period of time with geographically overbroad distances.
Criminalizing unpopular and even offensive speech does violence
to the First Amendment.  The First Amendment was meant to protect
unpopular speech.  Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
provide a balance between free speech and the interests of the
mourners.
V. SURVIVING CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
As demonstrated, the government has a significant interest in
honoring the right to mourn because it ultimately protects citizens
from emotional disturbance, and maintains the dignity of funerals.208
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the legislation be deemed content
neutral, that it is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication.”209
A. Ample Alternative Means of Communication
For the funeral picketing statutes to survive constitutional scru-
tiny, Westboro must “have other adequate ways to reach [its] audi-
ence.”210  Westboro’s primary means of reaching its audience has
been through picketing on public sidewalks across from funerals.  The
group also publishes its message through numerous websites, fliers,
press releases, faxes, and television.211
Although public sidewalks have traditionally been viewed as pub-
lic fora, a funeral does not become a public event merely because a
flag is draping a coffin or someone is playing Taps in the background.
A funeral is a private gathering of people who share the same goal: to
show respect to the deceased and/or the survivors.212  Whether
208. See discussion supra Part III.
209. McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (quoting Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)).
210. Michael A. Mugmon, Broadsheet Bullies?: Designated Public Forum and Established News-
papers’ Efforts to Rid Philadelphia’s Public Transit System of a Government-Sponsored Competitor,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1991 (2002).  Of course audience selection is up to the protester,
not the government.  Based on its message, Westboro’s targeted audience is not mourners
but the general public. Westboro does not limit its protests to mourners or military
families.
211. Some of the websites maintained by the group include: www.godhatesamerica.com;
www.godhatesfags.com; www.priestsrapeboys.com; www.hatemongers.com; www.yourpastor
isawhore.com; www.godhatescanada.com; www.godhatessweden.com; www.smellthebrim
stone.com.
212. Many individuals in Western culture announce burial details in obituaries and
some funerals receive media attention when the decedent was particularly heroic.  These
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Westboro is viewed as sincerely trying to share its message, or creating
a publicity stunt at the expense of the bereaved, it is clear that
Westboro’s speech has very little to do with the decedents.213
Westboro’s message is about the perceived favoritism America has
shown homosexuality.
Families and friends of deceased soldiers cannot impact the
United States’ policies on homosexuality.  Most of the deceased
soldiers are not public figures, but rather are private individuals.  In-
stead of targeting an audience that can reasonably respond to its
speech, Westboro chooses occasions to subject unwilling listeners to
ideas the listeners can do nothing about.  Because the funeral at-
tendees have little to no relation to Westboro’s message—other than
Westboro’s claim that the soldier’s death is a result of God’s wrath—
Westboro clearly has alternative means of communicating its message.
The legislation will have no impact on Westboro communicating its
message through its websites, press releases, fliers, and television ap-
pearances.  More importantly, Westboro may still participate in dem-
onstrations and picketing during the time periods and distances not
covered by the legislation.  The greatest constitutional challenge the
federal and state statutes face is the narrow tailoring requirement.
Ensuring that the government enacts statutes that are content
neutral and narrowly tailored will balance the rights of Westboro’s
speech against the rights of mourners.  Many of the statutory provi-
sions ban funeral picketing during a particular time and distance.
This type of ban on funeral picketing is justified based on an expan-
sion of the captive audience doctrine.
The Supreme Court previously upheld an ordinance that prohib-
ited focused residential picketing under the captive audience doc-
trine.214  Funeral picketing is at least as intrusive if not more so than
focused picketing of a residence; consequently, the captive audience
doctrine should be expanded to protect funeral attendees as well.215
facts, however, do not transform a private event into a public one.  Total strangers that
attend funerals share the same communal goal as the other attendees—to pay respect to
the decedent.  Funeral picketers do not try to join the gathering; they want to disrupt it.
213. See discussion supra note 143 (highlighting the fact that legislators recognize the R
targeted and hateful nature of the speech).
214. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476, 487–88 (1988).  The ordinance prohibited
“picketing ‘before or about’ any residence.” Id. at 476.  The Court explained that “[t]he
First Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when
the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech.” Id. at 487.
215. An expanded captive audience doctrine is not without its critics.  The Eighth Cir-
cuit declined to extend the doctrine beyond the residential context.  Phelps-Roper v.
Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 486–87 (8th Cir. 2007).  Constitutional law scholar Eugene Volokh
believes the principles of Frisby could apply to a funeral and recognizes that funeral picket-
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B. Captive Audience Rationale
To determine whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored, the
Court will consider the extent to which the ordinance is protecting
unwilling listeners who are a captive audience.  The concept of indi-
viduals being held captive was articulated by the Supreme Court in the
1940s in Kovacs v. Cooper, a case involving an ordinance that prohib-
ited sound trucks from emitting loud noises.216  In a plurality deci-
sion, the Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as constitutional.217
The Court explained:
The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be
offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take
it.  In his home or on the street he is practically helpless to
escape this interference with his privacy by loud speakers ex-
cept through the protection of the municipality.218
Another important case involving the captive audience doctrine
is Cohen v. California.219 Cohen involved a criminal conviction of an
individual who wore an offensive jacket inside a courthouse and was
later arrested for disturbing the peace.220  The jacket carried the slo-
gan “Fuck the Draft.”221  There was no speech involved other than the
public display of the jacket.222  The Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction and stated that individuals who were offended could simply
avert their eyes.223  In this instance, the rights of the speaker trumped
the rights of unwilling listeners.
Cohen is distinguishable from the funeral picketing scenario.
Most obviously, Cohen’s speech was an article of clothing.  The
speech involved in funeral picketing is substantially more confronta-
tional and offends more than the eyes.  Funeral picketing is not lim-
ing can be more intrusive than picketing hospitals or abortion clinics; however, he argues
that expansion would lead to a “slippery slope” where additional exceptions “would eventu-
ally swallow the rule.”  Eugene Volokh, Burying Funeral Protests, NAT’L REV., Mar. 23, 2006,
available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/volokh200603230730.asp.; see also
McDonough, supra note 17, at 18 (highlighting Eugene Volokh’s concern that complete R
funeral picketing bans have the potential to restrict general picketing). But cf. Phelps,
supra note 76, at 301 (explaining that courts could avoid stretching “the Frisby captive audi- R
ence doctrine to churches . . . because a liberal application of the doctrine potentially
could lead to overly excessive speech regulation”).
216. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78, 86–87 (1949) (plurality opinion).
217. Id. at 87.
218. Id. at 86–87 (citation omitted).
219. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
220. Id. at 16–17.
221. Id. at 16.
222. Id. at 16–17.
223. Id. at 21, 26.
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ited to signs, but includes chanting and other noise.  Moreover, unlike
a generic message regarding politics, funeral picketing often involves
personal attacks rejoicing in the private pain of the bereaved.  Over
the last few years, in balancing the rights of privacy against the right to
free speech, the Court has placed additional emphasis on the rights of
unwilling listeners.  This shift suggests that the reasoning in Cohen
should not apply to funeral picketing cases.
Expansion of the captive audience doctrine depends in large part
on the Court’s ruling in Frisby v. Schultz.224  In Frisby, abortion protes-
ters picketed outside an abortion doctor’s house on a public street.225
In response to the picketing, a municipal ordinance was passed that
prohibited picketing, with an exception for labor picketing, in resi-
dential neighborhoods.226  The Town Board expressed concern that
residential picketing “causes emotional disturbance and distress to the
occupants.”227  The lower courts enjoined enforcement of the ordi-
nance, but the Supreme Court reversed.228  As a threshold matter, the
Court deferred to the lower courts’ conclusion that the ordinance was
content neutral.229  The Court then held that the statute did not vio-
late the First Amendment because it addressed the targeted evil of
focused residential picketing.230  Most of the Court’s opinion was de-
voted to discussing the government’s significant interest in the protec-
tion of residential privacy.231
There are many parallels that can be drawn between residential
privacy and privacy in mourning.  The essential question is whether
the concept of residential privacy is based on the location of the home
or the idea of what the home represents.  The Supreme Court has
described the home as a retreat, a place of escape, and a sanctuary.232
Similarly, a funeral represents a moment of escape.  It is a time when
individuals similarly put aside “the tribulations of their daily pursuits”
while they focus on thoughts of mortality and grief.233  The Supreme
Court has already exhibited a willingness to apply the captive audi-
224. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
225. Id. at 476.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 477.
228. Id. at 478, 488.
229. Id. at 482.
230. Id. at 485–88.
231. Id. at 484.
232. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
233. Id.
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ence doctrine outside the context of residential privacy, particularly
when the interests of the unwilling listener are at stake.234
One of the reasons the Court decided in favor of the government
in Frisby was the targeted nature of the picketing.235  Justice
O’Connor, writing for the majority, explained that the focused picket-
ing was “narrowly directed at the household, not the public.  The type
of picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance generally do not
seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude
upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive
way.”236
Targeted picketing of a funeral is analogous to the targeted pick-
eting of a home.  Both are coercive forms of harassment.237  Funeral
picketing is not an expression of ideas, but an attempt to force a mes-
sage down the throat of an unwilling listener during an often tragic
and vulnerable time of his or her life.238  Just as “religious worship
[should] not be disturbed by those anxious to preach a doctrine of
atheism,”239 a funeral should not be disturbed by those anxious to
announce that the deceased is burning in hell.  The presence of pick-
eters at and during a funeral turns a private, solemn setting into a
confrontational one.  If the states are prevented from protecting their
citizens during a time of mourning in favor of harassment dressed up
in the guise of the First Amendment, the states would be rendered
234. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–18 (2000).  As the Court in Frisby explained,
“[t]here simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener.” Frisby,
487 U.S. at 485.
235. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.  The Court construed the ordinance to apply to targeted
residential picketing as opposed to general residential picketing. Id. at 482–83.
236. Id. at 486.
237. See Stanley, supra note 11, at 285 (“When people are in a location where they can- R
not freely leave or where they have a right to remain and the speech is not easily avoided,
the invasion of their privacy rights creates a greater justification for regulation.”).
238. Westboro has claimed it is exercising its religion in funeral picketing, and thus
argues that funeral picketing legislation also violates the group’s rights under the Free
Exercise Clause.  Suggestions in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction to Prevent
Defendants Nixon and Blunt from Enforcing § 578.501, Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F.
Supp. 2d 691 (W.D. Mo. 2007) (No. 06-4156-CV-C-NKL).  In its brief, the ACLU presents
Westboro as a group concerned with fulfilling its duty to warn survivors of things to come.
Id. at 3.  The argument is perplexing because Westboro’s signs do not tell mourners to pray
or repent; rather, Westboro’s signs indicate jubilation over tragedy and death by displaying
signs like “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “God Hates Your Tears.” See discussion
supra Part II and accompanying notes.  In fact, the ACLU’s depiction of Westboro is con-
tradicted by Westboro’s statements on its web pages. See Westboro, Home Page, supra note
19.  Westboro’s Free Exercise argument is particularly ironic because the group is content R
to ignore the beliefs of mourners and others who disagree with its message. See discussion
supra Part III.C.  Arguably, mourners and Westboro can both claim protection under the
Free Exercise Clause.
239. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949) (plurality opinion).
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impotent.  Grieving families’ only redress would be civil litigation.240
Legislatures that have enacted funeral picketing statutes are justified
in their attempt to protect funeral attendees.  The government’s inter-
est in protecting the “unwilling listener” was emphasized in both Hill
and Frisby.241
In Hill, the Supreme Court continued to “recogniz[e] the inter-
ests of unwilling listeners in [captive] situations.”242 Hill was signifi-
cant because it involved unwilling listeners in a public forum.243  In
Hill, the Court explained that “[t]he right to avoid unwelcome speech
has special force in the privacy of the home . . . but can also be pro-
tected in confrontational settings.”244  The Court in Frisby explained:
The First Amendment permits the government to prohibit
offensive speech as intrusive when the “captive” audience
cannot avoid the objectionable speech. . . .  The resident is
figuratively, and perhaps literally, trapped within the home,
and because of the unique and subtle impact of such picket-
240. The father of Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder successfully sued Westboro and
several of its members under the tort theories of invasion of privacy and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.  Order of Judgment, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 06-cv-1389-RDB (D.
Md. Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.matthewsnyder.org.  The jury awarded Mr. Sny-
der $10.9 million, which the trial judge reduced to $5 million. See Anna Messar, Note,
Balancing Freedom of Speech with the Right to Privacy: How to Legally Cope with the Funeral Protest
Problem, 28 PACE L. REV. 101, 124–26 (2007) (summarizing the Snyder lawsuit); Dolan,
supra note 70.  The large verdict has raised a debate among legal scholars about the role of R
free speech in tort law. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.
com/posts/chain-1194479521.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).  Interestingly, Westboro
stood 1,000 feet away from the funeral and was not viewed by Mr. Snyder until the news
coverage of the protest.  Gina Davis, At Carroll Funeral, a National Protest; Service for Marine is
Picketed by Kan. Church that Claims God is Punishing U.S. with Deaths, BALT. SUN, Mar. 11,
2006, at 1A; Matthew Dolan, Reversal Likely in Protest Verdict; First Amendment Applies Experts
Say, BALT. SUN, Nov. 2, 2007, at 1A.  The lawsuit was also based on website postings by
Westboro criticizing Mr. Snyder for raising his son “for the devil.”  Complaint ¶¶ 21–22,
Snyder v. Phelps, No. 06-cv-1389rdb (D. Md. June 5, 2006), available at http://www.mat-
thewsnyder.org.  Meanwhile Westboro remains undeterred by the verdict and has contin-
ued its funeral protests.  One of Westboro’s websites reads “Thank God for the 10.9M!!!
WBC prayed for it to be 109M!!!  WBC will continue preaching at funerals!!”  Westboro,
God Hates America Home Page, supra note 15.  Westboro’s appeal of the district court’s R
order denying its motion to dismiss or for summary judgment was dismissed by the Fourth
Circuit.  Snyder v. Phelps-Roper, 2007 WL 4239664 (4th Cir. 2007).
241. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485
(1988).
242. Hill, 530 U.S. at 718.
243. See supra discussion Part III.A and accompanying notes; see also Jennifer L. Maffett,
Balancing Freedom of Speech Against the Rights of Unwilling Listeners: The Attack on the First
Amendment in Hill v. Colorado, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 327, 329–30 (2001) (noting that in
Hill, “[f]or the first time, the Supreme Court gave greater weight to the rights of unwilling
listeners than the protection of free speech”).
244. Hill, 530 U.S. at 717 (citation omitted).
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ing is left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted
speech.245
Similarly, funeral attendees are trapped and have no means of
avoiding unwanted speech.  Picketing at funerals is personally
targeted at the decedent and his or her loved ones.  The unwilling
listener is not subjected to the offensive speech by happenstance, but
is a target during an emotionally charged time.  The funeral attendee
is not simply exposed to offensive speech, but chased in a corner and
trapped with no means of escape other than not attending the fu-
neral.246  If unwilling listeners can be protected on sidewalks adjacent
to medical facilities, that same protection should apply to unwilling
listeners on sidewalks adjacent to funerals.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “we are often ‘cap-
tives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech.”247  Consequently, in a courthouse, or on a public street, we
may encounter something offensive by happenstance and we must
make the decision to pay attention or avert our eyes.  A funeral is dif-
ferent.  Funeral picketing represents the type of speech identified in
Hill “that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid
it.”248 Hill acknowledged that the interests of the unwilling listener
“can . . . be protected [outside the home] in confrontational
settings.”249
Frisby can be viewed as potentially supporting the application of
the captive audience doctrine to houses of worship.250  As Judge
Bright explained in his dissent in Olmer v. Lincoln, “houses of wor-
ship—whether church, synagogue, or mosque—are sacred places
245. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487.
246. The district court in Taft rejected a similar argument by plaintiff that mourners
choose to attend funeral services and can avert their eyes.  523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 618 (N.D.
Ohio 2007).
247. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
248. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 (citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487).
249. Id. at 717.
250. See Phelps, supra note 76, at 300 (citations omitted), arguing that R
If the current Supreme Court were to expand the captive audience doctrine be-
yond the four walls of the home, churches present one of the strongest cases.
First, churches potentially present a high degree of real captivity.  Many reli-
gions require or strongly encourage in-church worship on specified days and at
specified times.  The congregation and spiritual leader not only might look upon
one’s absence from church with disfavor, but may even regard it as a punishable
sin.  For the true believers of many religions, whether and where to attend church
are matters of less flexibility than virtually any other activity.  When protesters
surround a house of worship, the faithful do not have the option of avoidance.
The unwilling listener simply must endure the offensive speech.
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where people seek rest and replenishment.”251  Similarly, the home
may be “the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.”252  Be-
cause this description of the home applies with equal force to houses
of worship, the same arguments can be used to support application of
the captive audience doctrine to funerals.  Individuals attending fu-
nerals should not be forced to choose between attending a funeral
and suffering from the signs and sounds of protesters who are literally
rejoicing over their pain, or forfeiting their right to mourn in commu-
nity with others.  Just as the sanctity of the home is respected, a fu-
neral is a sacred and private occasion that should be protected.
In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., the Supreme Court
agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that “the State’s strong inter-
est in residential privacy, acknowledged in Frisby v. Schultz, applied by
analogy to medical privacy.”253  The Court highlighted the Florida Su-
preme Court’s opinion “that while targeted picketing of the home
threatens the psychological well-being of the ‘captive’ resident,
targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psy-
chological, but also the physical, well-being of the patient held ‘cap-
tive’ by medical circumstance.”254  Similarly, targeted picketing of a
funeral could impact the psychological well-being of funeral at-
tendees.255  The process of mourning is a private time and a time nec-
essary for emotional well-being.  Just as there is no right to force
speech into the home of an unwilling listener, there should be no
right to force speech on a gathering of unwilling listeners who may be
emotionally vulnerable.
Funeral attendees’ status as unwilling listeners is elevated by the
heightened emotions involved in grieving.  The emotional distress of
funeral attendees may exceed that of residents in their homes or pa-
tients entering medical facilities.256  Not only is the captive audience
unable to avoid the speech, but their sensitivity to the speech is
greater.  This should trigger greater protection from the Court.
There are inherent privacy issues involved with funerals and
mourning.  Like funerals, the Supreme Court has recognized in-
stances where it would be “impractical for the unwilling viewer or au-
251. 192 F.3d 1176, 1185 (8th Cir. 1999) (Bright, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)).
253. 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (citation omitted).
254. Id.
255. See discussion supra Part III.B.
256. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. R
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ditor to avoid exposure.”257  The federal district court in Kentucky
recognized the captive nature of funerals in McQueary:
A funeral is a deeply personal, emotional and solemn occa-
sion.  Its attendees have an interest in avoiding unwanted,
obtrusive communications which is at least similar to a per-
son’s interest in avoiding such communications inside his
home.  Further, like medical patients entering a medical fa-
cility, funeral attendees are captive.  If they want to take part
in an event memorializing the deceased, they must go to the
place designated for the memorial event.  Whatever the
meaning of Hill, for purposes of this Opinion, the Court will
assume that the state has an interest in protecting funeral
attendees from unwanted communications that are so obtru-
sive that they are impractical to avoid.258
Funerals are a logical place to extend the captive audience doc-
trine.  As in Hill, funeral attendees are presumably unwilling listeners
in need of the Court’s protection.259  Funerals provide a stronger case
for assuming the existence of unwilling listeners than Hill.  In Cohen v.
California, the courthouse in which the offensive speech was displayed
was frequented by members of the general public, each with differing
views regarding the war that Cohen was protesting.260  Although the
Court did not focus on the issue in its analysis, presumably there
would have been a mixture of both willing and unwilling listeners in a
courthouse open to the public.261  In the context of medical clinics,
the Court expressed concern over the unwilling listener and the dis-
tress caused by the speakers exercising their First Amendment
rights.262  The Court did not recognize the possibility of willing listen-
ers being present.263  The implicit assumption was that individuals
257. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)).
258. McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
259. Hill, 530 U.S. at 718.
260. 403 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971).
261. See id. (noting that the presence of some unwilling listeners in a public building did
not justify conviction, especially when there was no evidence that “persons powerless to
avoid appellant’s conduct did in fact object to it”).  For a discussion of the Supreme
Court’s general failure to consider the rights of willing listeners under the captive audi-
ence doctrine, see generally Marcy Strauss, Redefining The Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 85 (1991), critiquing the ambiguity of the captive audience doctrine
and attempting to provide substance to the slogan.
262. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (“[T]argeted
picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but also the physical,
well-being of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance.”) (citing Operation Res-
cue v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 673 (Fla. 1993)).
263. In a footnote, the majority explained,
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seeking medical treatment, or loved ones visiting patients in the hospi-
tal, or women who had made decisions to obtain abortions were un-
willing to hear pro-life arguments.  It is an even more credible
argument that individuals attending a funeral are unwilling listeners
to speakers who wish to picket the funeral.  It is not the speech of the
funeral picketers, but the very act of coming to the funeral to picket,
that is so intrusive.  As the Supreme Court recognized, “[i]t may not
be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate ‘verbal or
visual assault,’ that justifies proscription.”264
The very presence of individuals protesting at a funeral, regard-
less of their message, is disruptive and harassing.  As Justice Stevens
explained, “[p]icketing is a form of speech that, by virtue of its repeti-
tion of message and often hostile presentation, may be disruptive of
an environment irrespective of the substantive message conveyed.”265
Similar to targeted residential picketing, the evil of targeted funeral
picketing is “created by the medium of expression itself.”266  Legisla-
tion drafted towards banning targeted funeral picketing should be
considered narrowly tailored.
C. Narrowly Tailored Requirement
1. Time Provisions
The majority of the state statutes aimed at funeral picketing con-
tain restrictions regulating the time of picketing activities near funer-
als.267  The temporal restrictions essentially ban speech during a
particular period before, during, and after a funeral.268  The time lim-
its also reinforce that picketers have ample alternative means for pick-
eting at any time other than that prescribed by the statute.  This total
ban on funeral picketing during the proscribed time is justified by the
state’s significant interest in regulating targeted picketing.  In their
The purpose of the Colorado statute is not to protect a potential listener from
hearing a particular message.  It is to protect those who seek medical treatment
from the potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an unwelcome
individual delivers a message (whatever its content) by physically approaching an
individual at close range . . . .
Hill, 530 U.S. at 718–19 n.25.
264. Id. at 716 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 n.6 (1975) (cita-
tions omitted)).
265. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 498 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 486 (majority opinion) (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 810 (1984)).
267. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the legislative response to funeral picketing).
268. See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text (noting particular statutes and R
their temporal restrictions).
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rush to enact legislation, however, some states have enacted statutes
that are overbroad.
A time, place, or manner regulation “may [not] burden substan-
tially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legiti-
mate interests.”269  The narrow tailoring requirement is satisfied if the
legislation “promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”270  In other words, the
statute must “target[ ] and eliminate[ ] no more than the exact source
of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”271  Legislation may be considered nar-
rowly tailored, even if it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive
means of satisfying the government’s stated interest.272
The federal and many of the state statutes impose a time regula-
tion ranging from thirty minutes to two hours, with the majority of the
legislation containing one-hour time limits.273  Arguably, speech re-
lated to abortion is time-sensitive.  Many pro-life demonstrators desire
not only to express their opinion, but influence individual decisions.
Funeral picketing, in contrast, is not time-sensitive.  The message be-
ing conveyed will not lose its force after the expiration of a few hours.
Even assuming the goal of funeral picketing is to influence ideas, the
ideas expressed have nothing to do with the funeral that is being
disrupted.274
The government’s interest in protecting those who mourn should
be at its highest during and immediately following the funeral.
Whether the significant governmental interest is to protect citizens
who mourn from additional emotional distress, to protect the solem-
nity and dignity of funerals, or to control noise and traffic, a one-hour
time limitation is narrowly tailored to achieve those goals.  The minor-
ity of states with provisions restricting picketing for two hours after a
funeral275 are at greater risk for being found unconstitutional.  A two-
hour ban on funeral picketing following a funeral burdens more
269. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
270. Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
271. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
272. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000).
273. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix. R
274. But see Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–4, Phelps-
Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691 (W.D. Mo. 2007) (No. 06-4156-CV-C-NKL) (arguing
that funerals are “the only place where [Westboro’s] religious message can and must be
delivered in a timely and relevant manner”); Suggestions in Support of Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction to Prevent Defendants Nixon and Blunt from Enforcing § 578.501 at 3,
Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691 (W.D. Mo. 2007) (No. 06-4156-CV-C-NKL)
(same).
275. The statutes in Delaware, Kansas, and Nebraska currently prohibit picketing from
one hour before, during, and two hours after a funeral. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303(b)
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speech than necessary.  The adoption of time ranges of a half-hour to
one hour in other jurisdictions suggests that one hour is sufficient.
Funeral attendees, especially family members, are known to at-
tend funerals early and remain for a short time after conclusion of the
service.  The issues of privacy in mourning, emotional distress, dignity,
noise, and traffic are ripe when attendees are arriving and leaving the
service, but not two hours after the service is completed.
2. Distance Requirements
The state statutes are most vulnerable to attack based on the vari-
ous distance requirements.276  Most of the funeral picketing statutes
prohibit picketing anywhere from 500 to 1,000 feet from the location
of the funeral.277  The Supreme Court has been reluctant to impose
significant distance requirements in the past.  When the Respect for
Fallen Heroes Act was submitted to Congress it had an original dis-
tance of 500 feet, but was later amended to 300 feet.278  Only eight
states enacted legislation with distance requirements of 300 feet or
less.279  In McQueary, the federal district court found a 300-foot dis-
(Supp. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015(e) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.03 (Supp.
2006).
276. The state of Missouri prohibited picketing “in front of or about” a funeral and had
a separate provision regarding a 300-foot distance that would apply only in the event the
former provision was found unconstitutional. MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (Supp. 2007).
The Phelps-Roper court held that the “in front of or about” provision was narrowly tailored
because it was similar to the ordinance upheld in Frisby. Phelps-Roper, 504 F. Supp. 2d at
696–97; see also discussion supra Part IV.E.
277. State statutes with distances requiring 500 feet include Georgia (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 6-11-34.2(b)(1) (2007)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3(c)(1) (LexisNexis Supp.
2006)), Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5(1) (West Supp. 2007)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.501(subd. 2)(1) (West Supp. 2007)), New Jersey (NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-
8.1(b)(2) (West Supp. 2007)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380(C)(2) (West
Supp. 2007)), Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b) (West Supp. 2007)), Ten-
nessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-317(b) (2006)), Texas (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 42.055(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006)), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.011(2)(a) (West
Supp. 2006)).  Three states require a distance of 1,000 feet: Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-35-18 (2006)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-525(A)(1) (Supp. 2006)), and
South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-13-19 (2006)).
278. Rebecca Bland, The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act: Conflicting Interests Raise
Hell with the First Amendment, 75 UMKC L. REV. 523, 529–30 (2006).
279. State statutes requiring distances of 100 feet include Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-9-125(1)(a) (West Supp. 2006)) and Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-
205(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006)).  Illinois is the only state with a 200-foot distance.  720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-6(c)(2) (West Supp. 2007).  Three hundred feet distance re-
quirements were adopted by Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303(a) (Supp. 2006)),
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.055(1)(b) (West Supp. 2006)), Nebraska (NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-1320.02(2) (Supp. 2006)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(8)(a)
(Supp. 2006)), and Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007)).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR201.txt unknown Seq: 46 11-MAR-08 9:20
340 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:295
tance provision unconstitutional.280  Based on prior Supreme Court
cases, the minority of states with distance requirements of 100 feet or
less will likely be found to be narrowly tailored.  Funeral attendees are
presumably unwilling listeners; however, there may be listeners in the
surrounding areas beyond a 100-foot distance who may be willing lis-
teners.  There is no significant governmental interest in protecting lis-
teners greater than 100 feet away, especially those who have no
connection with the funeral.  Time limitations provide better protec-
tion for mourners than overly broad distance requirements.  The most
analogous cases, in terms of distance requirements, are the buffer
zone distances in the abortion cases.
In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., the Supreme Court de-
clined to uphold a 300-foot buffer zone.281 Madsen involved an in-
junction against anti-abortion protesters.282  The injunction
established a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic, a 300-foot no-ap-
proach zone around the clinic, and a buffer zone around staff resi-
dences.283  The Court considered the 36-foot buffer zone narrowly
tailored because of the government’s interest in protecting access to
the clinic.284  Moreover, it noted that the protesters were still able to
communicate their message while being seen and heard from the
clinic parking lots.285  The Court found that the 300-foot zone was not
narrowly tailored because it would “ban ‘[g]eneral marching through
residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an en-
tire block of houses.’”286  The Court suggested in dicta that “a limita-
tion on the time, duration of picketing, and number of pickets
outside a smaller zone” would have been more narrowly tailored.287
The statutes with distance requirements of 500 feet and above
pose similar problems.  The geographic overbreadth of the statutes is
problematic because other expressive activity wholly unrelated to the
funeral would be impacted.  A 500-foot zone is roughly one and a half
280. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 996 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (holding 300-
foot zone was overly broad because, “it would restrict communications intended for the
general public on a matter completely unrelated to the funeral as well as messages targeted
at funeral participants”).
281. 512 U.S. 753, 773–74 (1994).
282. Id. at 758.
283. Id. at 759–61.
284. Id. at 769–70.
285. Id. at 770.
286. Id. at 775 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988)).
287. Id.
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football fields.288  Forcing the picketers to demonstrate at this dis-
tance would essentially silence them from their targeted audience.
Unlike the protesters in Madsen, the funeral attendees would probably
be unable to hear or see the picketers’ message.  Although effectively
silencing a message that could be characterized as hateful and harass-
ing seems appealing, it fails to strike a proper balance between the
right of free speech and the right to mourn.  The state regulations
cannot prevent funeral picketers like Westboro from communicating
their message, but they can find a balance between the protesters’
rights and the rights of the mourners.  There are no reports of
Westboro attempting to enter funeral homes or directly confront the
mourners; rather, they tend to picket on sidewalks directly across from
the funeral.289
The Court has expressed its reluctance to completely ban gener-
ally disseminated communication in public places,290 and sidewalks
are well-recognized public fora.291  In Hill, the Supreme Court upheld
a restriction in which unwelcome demonstrators could not come
closer than 8 feet to an individual within 100 feet of a health care
facility.292  The Court noted that the 8-foot distance “should not have
any adverse impact on the readers’ ability to read signs displayed by
demonstrators,”293 and would allow protesters to speak within a “nor-
mal conversational distance.”294  The distance requirements suggested
by the states would adversely impact the mourners’ ability to read the
signs or hear the protesters.
Courts have also been reluctant to impose significant distance re-
strictions in election polling cases.  In Burson v. Freeman, the Supreme
Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld a Tennessee statute that prohib-
ited campaign speech within 100 feet of a polling place.295  The Su-
preme Court was concerned about balancing free speech rights
288. See Seth H. Ruzi, Comment, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analysis Under the Open
View Doctrine: Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 191, 225–26 n.249
(1988) (noting that four football fields is 1,200 feet).
289. See Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV.
575, 578 (2007) (explaining how, in a typical Westboro funeral protest, a group of
Westboro members stand across the street from the funeral and picket).
290. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769 (“We have noted a distinction between the type of
focused picketing banned from the buffer zone and the type of generally disseminated
communication that cannot be completely banned in public places, such as handbilling
and solicitation.”).
291. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 480 (“[P]ublic streets and sidewalks have been used for
public assembly and debate, the hallmarks of a traditional public forum.”).
292. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729–30 (2000).
293. Id. at 726.
294. Id. at 726–27 (quoting Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997)).
295. 504 U.S. 191, 193–95 (1992) (plurality).
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against voting rights and electoral integrity.296  Although the Court
found the statute was content-based, it held that it served a compel-
ling interest in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud.297
The Court concluded that the 100-foot distance was reasonable.298
Burson was a pre-election case; consequently, the constitutional
right to vote was implicated.  Circuit courts have also limited distances
in post-election cases.299  The Ninth Circuit, in Daily Herald Co. v.
Munro, considered the constitutionality of a Washington statute that
prohibited exit or public opinion polls within 300 feet of polling
places.300  The state argued that it wanted to prevent disruption at
polling places.301  The court held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional, explaining that the areas within the 300 feet were traditional
public fora that encompass streets and sidewalks.302
State legislation banning picketing within 300 feet or more is sig-
nificantly broader than what the Supreme Court has previously up-
held.303  The distance requirements are unreasonable and reflect an
emotional dislike of Westboro’s behavior rather than a careful balanc-
ing of Westboro’s constitutional rights against those of the mourners.
States have a right to protect mourners; however, they do not have the
right to silence Westboro or its message.
Legislatures should amend the distance requirements in a way
that the demonstrator’s speech can still be communicated while pro-
tecting the rights of mourners.  Mourners are presently protected by
296. Id. at 198.
297. Id. at 197, 206.
298. See id. at 210 (finding that Tennessee’s decision to impose the 100-foot distance
requirement was not unconstitutional).
299. See, e.g., Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 663 (6th Cir. 2004) (500 feet not nar-
rowly tailored). But see Schirmer v. Edwards, 2 F.3d 117, 124 (5th Cir. 1993) (600 feet
narrowly tailored in a campaign-free zone). See also generally Blake D. Morant, Electoral
Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of Self-Restraint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2003) (arguing
for voluntary restraint by the media in election coverage and analyzing election polling
cases).
300. 838 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1988).
301. Id. at 385.
302. Id. at 384, 388.
303. But see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330–32 (1988) (upholding a statute prohibiting
congregation within 500 feet of any embassy).  The statute in Boos prohibited the display of
any sign that brings a foreign government into “public disrepute” within 500 feet of a
foreign embassy. Id. at 315.  The statute also prohibited multiple persons from congregat-
ing within 500 feet of the embassy.  The Court struck down the display clause of the statute
because it was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 334.  The congregation clause was upheld based
on the Court’s reading that it only applied to groups posing a security threat. Id. at 331.
The limited nature of Boos makes it difficult to apply in the funeral picketing context.  In
fact, the closest analogy to funeral picketing statutes would be with the display clause that
the Boos Court found unconstitutional.
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the time limits posed on picketing, and most mourners will never be
exposed to the picketers’ message because of such time limits.304  Dis-
tances closer to 100 feet would provide additional protection to
mourners while allowing picketers to exercise their First Amendment
rights.
D. Nature of Punishment and Injunctive Relief
All of the statutory provisions provide some form of criminal pun-
ishment for violation.305  The vast majority of the funeral picketing
statutes provide for misdemeanor punishment for violation,306 while
some of the statutes convert to felony punishment following a second
or third conviction.307  The misdemeanor penalty provisions would
likely survive intermediate scrutiny because the imposition of a fine or
misdemeanor jail time is narrowly tailored to advance the state’s inter-
est without placing an excessive burden on the protesters.
Thus far, Westboro has indicated reluctance to directly violate
the laws and risk arrest.308  Westboro has asserted facial challenges
against the recent legislation, characterizing the laws as overly
broad.309  A few of the statutes have specific provisions for injunctive
relief.  For example, the Oklahoma and Kansas statutes provide for
304. The limitation of this argument is that it effectively shields the targeted audience
from the speech.  The government cannot control who Westboro decides to target any
more than it can control Westboro’s message.
305. See infra Appendix.  A few statutes are also seeking to provide civil remedies to
surviving family members. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18(3) (2006) (providing that
violations could result in an injunction, damages, attorney’s fees, or remedies such as com-
pensation).  The Kansas legislature is proposing similar legislation to allow defamation ac-
tions.  S.B. 244, 2007 Sess. (Kan. 2007), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/
2008/244.pdf (“[I]f an act of libel or slander is committed at a funeral and the person
defamed is the deceased at such funeral or any living relative of the deceased, an action for
libel or slander . . . may be sustained . . . .”).
306. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-125(2) (West Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 871.01(2) (West Supp. 2007).
307. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303(c) (Supp. 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
26-6(d) (West Supp. 2007). Indiana and Michigan are the minority jurisdictions that make
funeral picketing a felony. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167d(2) (West Supp. 2006).
308. See McDonough, supra note 17, at 18 (stating that Westboro is cautious in its pro- R
tests, notifying law enforcement before protests and following law enforcement orders dur-
ing protests).  Instead of violating the law, parishioners of Westboro have filed suits seeking
injunctions enjoining the enforcement of statutes that would prohibit them from picket-
ing.  Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691, 694 (W.D. Mo. 2007); McQueary v.
Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d, 975, 978–79 (E.D. Ky. 2006); see also discussion supra Part IV.E.
309. Phelps-Roper, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 697; McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 979; see also discus-
sion supra Part IV.E.
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injunctive relief and award attorney’s fees.310  The Oklahoma statute
also provides a misdemeanor range of punishment for violations.311
Presumably, if Westboro decided to announce an upcoming protest, a
state could preempt Westboro by filing for injunctive relief, which
could ultimately result in contempt sanctions against Westboro.
While most statutes would be assessed under the standard in
Ward, injunctions are evaluated under a higher level of scrutiny.312
The Supreme Court addressed the proper scrutiny in Madsen.313  In
Madsen, the Court listed the reason injunctions are treated differently,
including the greater risks of censorship and discriminatory applica-
tion that come with injunctions, as opposed to general ordinances.314
The Court thus concluded that injunctions “require a somewhat more
stringent application of general First Amendment principles . . . .”315
As a threshold matter, a court would have to determine if the
injunction is content neutral.  A content-neutral injunction must “bur-
den no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest.”316  Because of the heightened level of review, seeking an in-
junction against Westboro poses the additional risk of some provisions
being found unconstitutional.  For example, an injunction that im-
poses a felony range of punishment for contempt would be more bur-
densome than necessary to protect the government’s interest.
Moreover, overly broad distances of 500 feet, like the distance provi-
sions in both Pennsylvania and Oklahoma,317 would fail under a
heightened constitutional scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
Speech should not be criminalized merely because it is upsetting
or deeply offensive.  Although freedom of speech is one of the most
cherished rights, it is not absolute.  The government must both pro-
tect the First Amendment and consider the interests of mourners.
Mourners represent the epitome of unwilling listeners.  Although citi-
310. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380(F) (West Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4015(g) (1995).
311. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380(E).  The misdemeanor range of punishment,
which is usually less than a year in jail and/or a fine, would probably survive the height-
ened review applied to injunctions.
312. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764–65 (1994).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 764.
315. Id. at 765.
316. Id.
317. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(b) (West Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1380(D) (West Supp. 2007).
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zens must tolerate offensive speech in public, a funeral is different.
Mourners are vulnerable to increased emotional distress, making the
government’s interest in protecting mourners significant.  Protesters
have a right to publish their message; however, they do not have the
right to impose their message on an audience that is captive and un-
willing to hear it.  Expansion of the captive audience doctrine to
targeted funeral picketing would provide better protection for mourn-
ers and properly balance the right of free speech against the right to
privacy.  Striking the proper balance between the interests of mourn-
ers and the fundamental right to free speech can only be accom-
plished by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.  Most of
the recently enacted state legislation with relatively broad proscrip-
tions should be amended to comply with reasonable distances closer
to 100 feet and time limits no longer than one hour.  Such amend-
ment would go a long way in upholding the fundamental principles
contained in the First Amendment, while protecting funeral attendees
during the particularly painful and private mourning process.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix contains portions from twenty-nine state statutes
that address picketing funerals.
Alabama
Section 1.
(a) A person commits the crime of disrupting a funeral
or memorial service if, during the 60 minutes immediately
preceding a funeral or memorial service that has a scheduled
starting time, during the funeral or memorial service, or im-
mediately following the funeral or memorial service, the per-
son does any of the following with the intention of
disrupting the funeral or memorial service:
(1) Engages in a protest, including, but not limited to,
protest with or without using an electric sound amplification
device, that involves singing, chanting, whistling, yelling, or
honking a motor vehicle horn within 500 feet of the en-
trance to a facility being used for a funeral or memorial
service.
Act of April 17, 2006, H.B. 661, REG. SESS. (Al. 2006) (to be codi-
fied at ALA. CODE § 13A-11-17).
Colorado
§ 18-9-125.  Interference with a funeral
(1) A person commits interference with a funeral if he
or she, knowing a funeral is being conducted:
(a) Refuses to leave any private property within one
hundred feet of the funeral site upon the request of the
owner of the private property or the owner’s agent; or
(b) Refuses to leave any public property within one hun-
dred feet of the funeral site upon the request of a public
official with authority over the property or upon the request
of a peace officer, and the public official or peace officer
making the request has reasonable grounds to believe the
person has violated a rule or regulation applicable to that
property or a statute or local ordinance.
Right to Rest in Peace Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-125
(West Supp. 2006).
Delaware
§ 1303.  Disorderly conduct; funeral or memorial service
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(a) A person shall not do any of the following within 300
feet of the building or other location where a funeral or me-
morial service is being conducted, or within 1,000 feet of a
funeral procession or burial:
(1) Direct abusive epithets or make any threatening ges-
ture which the person knows or reasonably should know is
likely to provoke a violent reaction by another.
(2) Disturb or disrupt the funeral, memorial service, fu-
neral procession, or burial by conduct intended to disturb or
disrupt the funeral, memorial service, funeral procession or
burial.
(b) This section applies to conduct within 1 hour pre-
ceding, during and within 2 hours after a funeral, memorial
service, funeral procession or burial.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303 (Supp. 2006).
Florida
§ 871.01.  Disturbing schools and religious and other assemblies
(2) Whoever willfully interrupts or disturbs any assembly
of people met for the purpose of acknowledging the death of
an individual with a military funeral honors detail pursuant
to 10 U.S.C. s. 1491 commits a misdemeanor of the first
degree . . . .
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 871.01 (West Supp. 2007).
Georgia
§ 16-11-34.2.  Disorderly or disruptive conduct at any funeral or
memorial service
(b) It shall be unlawful to engage in any disorderly or
disruptive conduct with the intent to impede, disrupt, dis-
turb, or interfere with the orderly conduct of any funeral or
memorial service or with the normal activities and functions
carried on in the facilities or buildings where such funeral or
memorial service is taking place.  Any or all of the following
shall constitute such disorderly or disruptive conduct:
(1) Displaying any visual images that convey fighting
words or actual or imminent threats of harm . . . ;
(2) Uttering loud, threatening, or abusive language or
singing, chanting, whistling, or yelling with or without noise
amplification including, but not limited to, bullhorns, auto-
mobile horns, and microphones, such as would tend to im-
pede, disrupt, disturb, or interfere with a funeral or
memorial service within 500 feet . . . ;
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(3) Attempting to block or blocking pedestrian or vehic-
ular access to the ceremonial site or location being used for a
funeral or memorial service at any time one hour prior to,
during, or one hour after the posted time for said funeral or
memorial service; or
(4) Conducting a public assembly, parade, demonstra-
tion, or other like event, either fixed or processional . . . .
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2007).
Illinois
§ 5/26-6.  Disorderly conduct at a funeral or memorial service
(c) A person commits the offense of disorderly conduct
at a funeral or memorial service when he or she:
(1) engages, with knowledge of the existence of a fu-
neral site, in any loud singing, playing of music, chanting,
whistling, yelling, or noisemaking with, or without, noise am-
plification . . . ;
(2) displays . . . within 200 feet of any ingress or egress
of that funeral site, any visual images that convey fighting
words or actual or veiled threats against any other person; or
(3) . . . knowingly obstructs, hinders, impedes, or blocks
another person’s entry to or exit from that funeral site . . . .
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-6 (West Supp. 2007).
Indiana
§ 35-45-1-3.  Disorderly conduct
(a) A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally:
. . .
(3) disrupts a lawful assembly of persons; commits disor-
derly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor.
. . .
(c) The offense described in subsection (a) is a Class D
felony if it:
(1) is committed within five hundred (500) feet of:
(A) the location where a burial is being performed;
(B) a funeral procession, if the person described in sub-
section (a) knows that the funeral procession is taking place;
or
(C) a building in which:
(i) a funeral or memorial service; or
(ii) the viewing of a deceased person; is being con-
ducted; and
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(2) adversely affects the funeral, burial, viewing, funeral
procession, or memorial service.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
Iowa
§ 723.5.  Disorderly conduct—funeral or memorial service
1.  A person shall not do any of the following within five
hundred feet of the building or other location where a fu-
neral or memorial service is being conducted, or within five
hundred feet of a funeral procession or burial:
a.  Make loud and raucous noise which causes unreason-
able distress . . . .
b.  Direct abusive epithets or make any threatening ges-
ture which the person knows or reasonably should know is
likely to provoke a violent reaction by another.
c.  Disturb or disrupt the funeral, memorial service, fu-
neral procession, or burial by conduct intended to disturb or
disrupt . . . .
2.  This section applies to conduct within sixty minutes
preceding, during, and within sixty minutes after a funeral,
memorial service, funeral procession, or burial.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5 (West Supp. 2007).
Kansas
§ 21-4015.  Funeral picketing; unlawful acts; penalty; other relief
(e) It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing
before or about any cemetery, church or mortuary within
one hour prior to, during and two hours following the com-
mencement of a funeral.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (1995).
Kentucky
§ 525.055.  Disorderly conduct in the first degree
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct in the first
degree when he or she:
. . .
(b) Acts in a way described in paragraph (a) . . . within
three hundred (300) feet of a:
1. Cemetery during a funeral or burial;
2. Funeral home during the viewing of a deceased
person;
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3. Funeral procession; [or]
4. Funeral or memorial service;
. . . and
(c) Knows that he or she is within three hundred (300)
feet of an occasion described in paragraph (b) of this
subsection.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.055 (West Supp. 2006).
§ 525.145.  Disrupting meetings and processions in the first
degree
(1) A person is guilty of disrupting meetings and proces-
sions in the first degree when, with intent to prevent or dis-
rupt a funeral or burial, funeral home viewing of a deceased
person, funeral procession, or funeral or memorial service
for a deceased person, he or she does any act tending to ob-
struct or interfere with it physically or makes any utterance,
gesture, or display designed to outrage the sensibilities of the
group attending the occasion.
Id. § 525.145.
§ 525.155.  Interference with a funeral
(1) A person is guilty of interference with a funeral
when he or she at any time on any day:
(a) Blocks, impedes, inhibits, or in any other manner
obstructs or interferes with access into or from any building
or parking lot of a building in which a funeral . . . is being
conducted . . . ;
(b) Congregates, pickets, patrols, demonstrates, or en-
ters on that portion of a public right-of-way or private prop-
erty that is within three hundred (300) feet of an event
specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection; or
(c) Without authorization from the family of the de-
ceased or person conducting the service, during a funeral,
wake, memorial service, or burial:
1. Sings, chants, whistles, shouts, yells, or uses a bul-
lhorn, auto horn, sound amplification equipment, or other
sounds or images observable to or within earshot of partici-
pants in the funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial; or
2. Distributes literature or any other item.
Id. §  525.155.
Louisiana
§ 103.  Disturbing the peace
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A.  Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the fol-
lowing in such manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm
the public:
. . .
(7) Intentionally engaging in any act or any utterance,
gesture, or display designed to disrupt a funeral, funeral
home viewing, funeral procession, wake, memorial service,
or burial of a deceased person;
(8) Intentionally blocking, impeding, inhibiting, or in
any other manner obstructing or interfering with access into
or from any building or parking lot of a building in which a
funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial is being con-
ducted, or any burial plot or the parking lot of the cemetery
in which a funeral, wake, memorial service, or burial is being
conducted.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (Supp. 2007).
Maryland
§ 10-205.  Obstruction, etc., of entry to or exit from funeral, bur-
ial, memorial service, or funeral procession
(a) . . .
(2) A person may not knowingly obstruct, hinder, im-
pede, or block another person’s entry to or exit from a fu-
neral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession . . . .
(b) . . . A person may not address speech to a person
attending a funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral pro-
cession that is likely to incite or produce an imminent
breach of the peace.
(c) . . . A person may not engage in picketing activity
within 100 feet of a funeral, burial, memorial service, or fu-
neral procession that is targeted at one or more persons at-
tending the funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral
procession.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
Michigan
§ 750.167d.  Disturbing funeral, memorial service, procession, or
burial
(1) A person shall not do any of the following within
500 feet of a building or other location where a funeral, me-
morial service, or viewing of a deceased person is being con-
ducted or within 500 feet of a funeral procession or burial:
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(a) Make loud and raucous noise and continue to do so
after being asked to stop.
(b) Make any statement or gesture that would make a
reasonable person under the circumstances feel intimidated,
threatened, or harassed.
(c) Engage in any other conduct that the person knows
or should reasonably know will disturb, disrupt, or adversely
affect the funeral, memorial service, viewing of the deceased
person, funeral procession, or burial.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167d (West Supp. 2006).
Minnesota
§ 609.501.  Funeral or burial service; prohibited acts
Subd. 2.  Crime to disrupt.  (a) Whoever does any of the fol-
lowing is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) with intent to disrupt a funeral ceremony, graveside
service, or memorial service, protests or pickets within 500
feet of the burial site or the entrance to a facility or location
being used for the service or ceremony, within one hour
prior to, during, or one hour following the service or
ceremony;
(2) with intent to disrupt a funeral procession, impedes
or attempts to impede a vehicle that is part of the procession;
(3) intentionally blocks or attempts to block access to a
funeral ceremony, graveside service, or memorial service; or
(4) knowingly engages in targeted residential picketing
at the home or domicile of any surviving member of the de-
ceased person’s family or household on the date of the fu-
neral ceremony, graveside service, or memorial service.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.501 (West Supp. 2007).
Mississippi
§ 97-35-18.  Disturbance by disruptive protest of funeral, burial
service, or memorial service
(a) Whoever does any of the following shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor:
(i) With intent to disrupt a funeral service, graveside ser-
vice, memorial service, or funeral ceremony, protests or pick-
ets within 1,000 feet of the location or locations at which the
service or ceremony is being conducted within one (1) hour
before, during, and one (1) hour following the service or
ceremony;
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(ii) With intent to disrupt a funeral procession impedes
vehicles that are part of the funeral procession;
(iii) Intentionally blocks access to a funeral service, fu-
neral ceremony, graveside service or memorial service; or
(iv) Engages in targeted residential picketing at the
home or domicile of any surviving member of the deceased
person’s immediate family on the date of the service or
ceremony . . . .
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (2006).
Missouri
§ 578.501.  Short title—protest activities at funerals
2.  It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in pick-
eting or other protest activities in front of or about any loca-
tion at which a funeral is held, within one hour prior to the
commencement of any funeral, and until one hour following
the cessation of any funeral.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.501 (West Supp. 2007).
Nebraska
§ 28-1320.02.  Unlawful picketing of a funeral; terms, defined
(2) Picketing of a funeral means protest activities en-
gaged in by a person or persons located within three hun-
dred feet of a cemetery, mortuary, church, or other place of
worship during a funeral.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.02 (Supp. 2006).
§ 28-1320.03.  Unlawful picketing of a funeral; penalty
(1) A person commits the offense of unlawful picketing
of a funeral if he or she engages in picketing from one hour
prior to through two hours following the commencement of
a funeral.
Id. § 28-1320.03.
New Jersey
§ 2C:33-8.1.  Demonstrations at funerals; definitions
b.  A person is guilty of disrupting a funeral if, during
the period beginning one hour prior to the scheduled com-
mencement of a funeral, and until one hour following the
actual completion of the funeral, with the purpose of caus-
ing inconvenience, annoyance or alarm to the funeral or its
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participants, or of recklessly creating the risk thereof, the
person knowingly:
(1) obstructs . . . another person’s entry to or exit from
the funeral, the funeral procession, the funeral home,
church, synagogue, temple or other place of public worship
or other location at which a funeral takes place as part of
demonstration activities, or
(2) engages in demonstration activities within 500 feet
of the funeral . . . and makes or assists in the making of
noise, diversions, or threatening gestures, or engages in any
other disruptive conduct, that disrupts or tends to disrupt
the peace or good order of the funeral.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West Supp. 2007).
North Carolina
§ 14-288.4.  Disorderly conduct
(a) Disorderly conduct is a public disturbance intention-
ally caused by any person who does any of the following:
. . .
(8) Engages in conduct with the intent to impede, dis-
rupt, disturb, or interfere with the orderly administration of
any funeral, . . . including a military funeral . . . .  Any of the
following conduct that occurs within one hour preceding,
during, or within one hour after a funeral or memorial ser-
vice shall constitute disorderly conduct under this
subdivision:
a.  Displaying, within 300 feet of the ceremonial site, . . .
any visual image that conveys fighting words or actual or im-
minent threats of harm . . . .
b.  Uttering, within 300 feet of the ceremonial site, . . .
loud, threatening, or abusive language or singing, chanting,
whistling, or yelling with or without noise amplification . . . .
c.  Attempting to block or blocking pedestrian or vehic-
ular access to the ceremonial site or location being used for a
funeral or memorial.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4 (Supp. 2006).
Ohio
§ 3767.30.  Protest activities near funeral or burial service or fu-
neral procession
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish the
person’s sentiments on all subjects, . . . but no person shall
picket or engage in other protest activities . . . within three
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hundred feet of any residence, cemetery, funeral home,
church, synagogue, or other establishment during or within
one hour before or one hour after the conducting of an ac-
tual funeral or burial service at that place.  No person shall
picket or engage in other protest activities, nor shall any as-
sociation or corporation cause picketing or other protest ac-
tivities to occur, within three hundred feet of any funeral
procession.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
Oklahoma
§ 1380.  Oklahoma Funeral Picketing Act—Findings—Pur-
poses—Definitions—Penalties—Damages
D.  It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing
within five hundred (500) feet of any cemetery, church, mor-
tuary or other place where any portion of a funeral service is
held during the period from one hour before the scheduled
commencement of funeral services until one hour after the
actual completion of the funeral services.
Oklahoma Funeral Picketing Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1380
(West Supp. 2007).
Pennsylvania
§ 7517.  Commemorative service demonstration activities
(b) . . . A person commits a misdemeanor of the third
degree if the person engages in demonstration activities
within 500 feet of any cemetery, mortuary, church or other
location being utilized for the purposes of commemorative
service within one hour prior to, during and one hour fol-
lowing the commemorative service.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West Supp. 2007).
South Carolina
§ 16-17-525.  Willfully, knowingly or maliciously disturbing fu-
neral service; penalties
(A) It is unlawful for a person to willfully, knowingly, or
maliciously disturb or interrupt a funeral service. . . .  This
subsection applies to a wilful [sic], knowing, or malicious dis-
turbance or interruption within:
(1) one thousand feet of the funeral service; and
(2) a time period of one-half hour before the funeral
service until one-half hour after the funeral service.
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(B) It is unlawful for a person to undertake an activity at
a public or privately owned cemetery, other than the deco-
rous participation in a funeral service or visitation of a burial
space, without the prior written approval of the public or pri-
vate owner.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-525 (Supp. 2006).
South Dakota
§ 22-13-17.  Picketing of funeral services prohibited—Violation as
misdemeanor
No person may engage in any act of picketing at any
funeral service during the period from one hour before the
scheduled commencement of the funeral services until one
hour after the actual completion of the funeral services.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-13-17 (2006).
§ 22-13-19.  Picketing defined
[T]he term, picketing, means protest activities engaged
in by any person stationed within one thousand feet of a fu-
neral service within one hour prior to, during, and one hour
following the commencement of any funeral service.
Id. § 22-13-19.
Tennessee
§ 39-17-317.  Disorderly conduct at funerals
(a) A person commits the offense of interfering with a
funeral or burial, funeral home viewing of a deceased per-
son, funeral procession, or funeral or memorial service for a
deceased person, if the person acts to obstruct or interfere
with such commemorative service by making any utterance,
gesture, or display in a manner offensive to the sensibilities
of an ordinary person.  Picketing, protesting, or demonstrat-
ing at a funeral or memorial service shall be deemed offen-
sive to the sensibilities of an ordinary person.
(b) The provisions of this section shall only apply to acts
within five hundred feet (500’) of a funeral or burial . . . .
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-317 (2006).
Texas
§ 42.055.  Funeral Service Disruptions
(b) A person commits an offense if, during the period
beginning one hour before the service begins and ending
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one hour after the service is completed, the person engages
in picketing within 500 feet of a facility or cemetery being
used for a funeral service.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
Vermont
§ 3771.  Disturbing a funeral service
(b) No person shall disturb or attempt to disturb a fu-
neral service by engaging in picketing within 100 feet of the
service within one hour prior to and two hours following the
publicly announced time of the commencement of the
service.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771 (Supp. 2006).
Virginia
§ 18.2-415.  Disorderly conduct in public places
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with the in-
tent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
. . .
B.  Willfully . . . disrupts any funeral [or] memorial ser-
vice . . . if the disruption (i) prevents or interferes with the
orderly conduct of the funeral, memorial service, or meeting
or (ii) has a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the
person or persons at whom, individually, the disruption is
directed . . . .
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (Supp. 2007).
Wisconsin
§ 947.011.  Disrupting a funeral or memorial service
(2)(a) No person may do any of the following during a
funeral or memorial service, during the 60 minutes immedi-
ately preceding the scheduled starting time of a funeral or
memorial service if a starting time has been scheduled, or
during the 60 minutes immediately following a funeral or
memorial service:
1.  Engage in conduct that is prohibited under § 947.01
within 500 feet of any entrance to a facility being used for the
service with the intent to disrupt the service.
2.  Intentionally block access to a facility being used for
the service.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.011 (West Supp. 2006).
